Robust combinatorial auction protocol against false-name bids

Makoto Yokoo, Yuko Sakurai, Shigeo Matsubara

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

93 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper presents a new combinatorial auction protocol that is robust against false-name bids. Internet auctions have become an integral part of Electronic Commerce (EC) and a promising field for applying agent and Artificial Intelligence technologies. Although the Internet provides an excellent infrastructure for combinatorial auctions, we must consider the possibility of a new type of cheating, i.e., an agent tries to profit from submitting several bids under fictitious names (false-name bids). If there exists no false-name bid, the Generalized Vickrey Auction protocol (GVA) satisfies individual rationality, Pareto efficiency, and incentive compatibility. On the other hand, when false-name bids are possible, it is theoretically impossible for a combinatorial auction protocol to simultaneously satisfy these three properties. Our newly developed Leveled Division Set (LDS) protocol, which is a modification of the GVA, utilizes reservation prices of auctioned goods for making decisions on whether to sell goods in a bundle or separately. The LDS protocol satisfies individual rationality and incentive compatibility even if agents can submit false-name bids, although it is not guaranteed to achieve a Pareto efficient social surplus. Simulation results show that the LDS protocol can achieve a better social surplus than that for a protocol that always sells goods in one bundle.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)167-181
Number of pages15
JournalArtificial Intelligence
Volume130
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Aug 1 2001

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auction
Network protocols
rationality
incentive
Internet
electronic commerce
artificial intelligence
Names
Auctions
Electronic commerce
profit
infrastructure
Artificial intelligence
decision making
efficiency
Profitability
simulation
Decision making

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Language and Linguistics
  • Linguistics and Language
  • Artificial Intelligence

Cite this

Robust combinatorial auction protocol against false-name bids. / Yokoo, Makoto; Sakurai, Yuko; Matsubara, Shigeo.

In: Artificial Intelligence, Vol. 130, No. 2, 01.08.2001, p. 167-181.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Yokoo, Makoto ; Sakurai, Yuko ; Matsubara, Shigeo. / Robust combinatorial auction protocol against false-name bids. In: Artificial Intelligence. 2001 ; Vol. 130, No. 2. pp. 167-181.
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