Robust double auction protocol against false-name bids

M. Yokoo, Y. Sakurai, S. Matsubara

Research output: Contribution to conferencePaper

32 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Internet auctions have become an integral part of Electronic Commerce (EC) and a promising field for applying agent technologies. Although the Internet provides an excellent infrastructure for large-scale auctions, we must consider the possibility of a new type of cheating, i.e., a bidder trying to profit from submitting several bids under fictitious names (false-name bids). Double auctions are an important subclass of auction protocols that permit multiple buyers and sellers to bid to exchange a good, and have been widely used in stock, bond, and foreign exchange markets. If there exists no false-name bid, a double auction protocol called PMD protocol has proven to be dominant-strategy incentive compatible. On the other hand, if we consider the possibility of false-name bids, the PMD protocol is no longer dominant-strategy incentive compatible. In this paper, we develop a new double auction protocol called the Threshold Price Double auction (TPD) protocol, which is dominant-strategy incentive compatible even if participants can submit false-name bids. The characteristics of the TPD protocol is that the number of trades and prices of exchange are controlled by the threshold price. Simulation results show that this protocol can achieve a social surplus that is very close to being Pareto efficient.

Original languageEnglish
Pages137-145
Number of pages9
Publication statusPublished - Jan 1 2001
Event21st IEEE International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems - Mesa, AZ, United States
Duration: Apr 16 2001Apr 19 2001

Other

Other21st IEEE International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems
CountryUnited States
CityMesa, AZ
Period4/16/014/19/01

Fingerprint

Network protocols
Polarization mode dispersion
Internet
Electronic commerce
Profitability

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Software
  • Hardware and Architecture
  • Computer Networks and Communications

Cite this

Yokoo, M., Sakurai, Y., & Matsubara, S. (2001). Robust double auction protocol against false-name bids. 137-145. Paper presented at 21st IEEE International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems, Mesa, AZ, United States.

Robust double auction protocol against false-name bids. / Yokoo, M.; Sakurai, Y.; Matsubara, S.

2001. 137-145 Paper presented at 21st IEEE International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems, Mesa, AZ, United States.

Research output: Contribution to conferencePaper

Yokoo, M, Sakurai, Y & Matsubara, S 2001, 'Robust double auction protocol against false-name bids', Paper presented at 21st IEEE International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems, Mesa, AZ, United States, 4/16/01 - 4/19/01 pp. 137-145.
Yokoo M, Sakurai Y, Matsubara S. Robust double auction protocol against false-name bids. 2001. Paper presented at 21st IEEE International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems, Mesa, AZ, United States.
Yokoo, M. ; Sakurai, Y. ; Matsubara, S. / Robust double auction protocol against false-name bids. Paper presented at 21st IEEE International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems, Mesa, AZ, United States.9 p.
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