Robust double auction protocol against false-name bids

Makoto Yokoo, Yuko Sakurai, Shigeo Matsubara

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

19 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In this paper, we develop a new double auction protocol called the Threshold Price Double auction (TPD) protocol, which is dominant-strategy incentive compatible even if participants can submit several bids under fictitious names (false-name bids). In Internet auctions, false-name bids are very difficult to detect since identifying each participant on the Internet is virtually impossible. The characteristics of the TPD protocol are that the number of trades and prices of exchange are controlled by the threshold price. Simulation results show that this protocol can achieve a social surplus that is very close to being Pareto efficient.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)241-252
Number of pages12
JournalDecision Support Systems
Volume39
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Apr 1 2005

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All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Management Information Systems
  • Information Systems
  • Developmental and Educational Psychology
  • Arts and Humanities (miscellaneous)
  • Information Systems and Management

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