Robustness against agent failure in hedonic games

Ayumi Igarashi, Kazunori Ota, Yuko Sakurai, Makoto Yokoo

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

We study how stability can be maintained even after any set of at most k players leave their groups, in the context of hedonic games. While stability properties ensure an outcome to be robust against players' deviations, it has not been considered how an unexpected change caused by a sudden deletion of players affects stable outcomes. In this paper, we propose a novel criterion that reshapes stability form robustness aspect. We observe that some stability properties can be no longer preserved even when a single agent is removed. However, we obtain positive results by focusing on symmetric friend-oriented hedonic games. We prove that we can efficiently decide the existence of robust outcomes with respect to Nash stability under deletion of any number of players or contractual individual stability under deletion of a single player. We also prove that symmetric additively separable games always admit an individual stable outcome that is robust with respect to individual rationality.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings of the 28th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 2019
EditorsSarit Kraus
PublisherInternational Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence
Pages364-370
Number of pages7
ISBN (Electronic)9780999241141
Publication statusPublished - Jan 1 2019
Event28th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 2019 - Macao, China
Duration: Aug 10 2019Aug 16 2019

Publication series

NameIJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Volume2019-August
ISSN (Print)1045-0823

Conference

Conference28th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 2019
CountryChina
CityMacao
Period8/10/198/16/19

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Artificial Intelligence

Cite this

Igarashi, A., Ota, K., Sakurai, Y., & Yokoo, M. (2019). Robustness against agent failure in hedonic games. In S. Kraus (Ed.), Proceedings of the 28th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 2019 (pp. 364-370). (IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence; Vol. 2019-August). International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence.

Robustness against agent failure in hedonic games. / Igarashi, Ayumi; Ota, Kazunori; Sakurai, Yuko; Yokoo, Makoto.

Proceedings of the 28th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 2019. ed. / Sarit Kraus. International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence, 2019. p. 364-370 (IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence; Vol. 2019-August).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Igarashi, A, Ota, K, Sakurai, Y & Yokoo, M 2019, Robustness against agent failure in hedonic games. in S Kraus (ed.), Proceedings of the 28th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 2019. IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, vol. 2019-August, International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence, pp. 364-370, 28th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 2019, Macao, China, 8/10/19.
Igarashi A, Ota K, Sakurai Y, Yokoo M. Robustness against agent failure in hedonic games. In Kraus S, editor, Proceedings of the 28th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 2019. International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence. 2019. p. 364-370. (IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence).
Igarashi, Ayumi ; Ota, Kazunori ; Sakurai, Yuko ; Yokoo, Makoto. / Robustness against agent failure in hedonic games. Proceedings of the 28th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 2019. editor / Sarit Kraus. International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence, 2019. pp. 364-370 (IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence).
@inproceedings{0cc3aa3a4aad4b3f98ab51c79af8bd01,
title = "Robustness against agent failure in hedonic games",
abstract = "We study how stability can be maintained even after any set of at most k players leave their groups, in the context of hedonic games. While stability properties ensure an outcome to be robust against players' deviations, it has not been considered how an unexpected change caused by a sudden deletion of players affects stable outcomes. In this paper, we propose a novel criterion that reshapes stability form robustness aspect. We observe that some stability properties can be no longer preserved even when a single agent is removed. However, we obtain positive results by focusing on symmetric friend-oriented hedonic games. We prove that we can efficiently decide the existence of robust outcomes with respect to Nash stability under deletion of any number of players or contractual individual stability under deletion of a single player. We also prove that symmetric additively separable games always admit an individual stable outcome that is robust with respect to individual rationality.",
author = "Ayumi Igarashi and Kazunori Ota and Yuko Sakurai and Makoto Yokoo",
year = "2019",
month = "1",
day = "1",
language = "English",
series = "IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence",
publisher = "International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence",
pages = "364--370",
editor = "Sarit Kraus",
booktitle = "Proceedings of the 28th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 2019",

}

TY - GEN

T1 - Robustness against agent failure in hedonic games

AU - Igarashi, Ayumi

AU - Ota, Kazunori

AU - Sakurai, Yuko

AU - Yokoo, Makoto

PY - 2019/1/1

Y1 - 2019/1/1

N2 - We study how stability can be maintained even after any set of at most k players leave their groups, in the context of hedonic games. While stability properties ensure an outcome to be robust against players' deviations, it has not been considered how an unexpected change caused by a sudden deletion of players affects stable outcomes. In this paper, we propose a novel criterion that reshapes stability form robustness aspect. We observe that some stability properties can be no longer preserved even when a single agent is removed. However, we obtain positive results by focusing on symmetric friend-oriented hedonic games. We prove that we can efficiently decide the existence of robust outcomes with respect to Nash stability under deletion of any number of players or contractual individual stability under deletion of a single player. We also prove that symmetric additively separable games always admit an individual stable outcome that is robust with respect to individual rationality.

AB - We study how stability can be maintained even after any set of at most k players leave their groups, in the context of hedonic games. While stability properties ensure an outcome to be robust against players' deviations, it has not been considered how an unexpected change caused by a sudden deletion of players affects stable outcomes. In this paper, we propose a novel criterion that reshapes stability form robustness aspect. We observe that some stability properties can be no longer preserved even when a single agent is removed. However, we obtain positive results by focusing on symmetric friend-oriented hedonic games. We prove that we can efficiently decide the existence of robust outcomes with respect to Nash stability under deletion of any number of players or contractual individual stability under deletion of a single player. We also prove that symmetric additively separable games always admit an individual stable outcome that is robust with respect to individual rationality.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85074912748&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85074912748&partnerID=8YFLogxK

M3 - Conference contribution

AN - SCOPUS:85074912748

T3 - IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence

SP - 364

EP - 370

BT - Proceedings of the 28th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 2019

A2 - Kraus, Sarit

PB - International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence

ER -