Sanctions triggered by jealousy help promote the cooperation in spatial prisoner's dilemma games

Ryo Matsuzawa, Jun Tanimoto

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

2 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Human beings have a natural tendency to feel jealous of those who have more than themselves. A previous report found that harmful behavior stemming from jealousy can actually encourage cooperation. The present study considers the efficiency of jealousy-motivated sanctions and the appropriate balance of sanctions and enforcement costs to best encourage cooperation. Through a series of numerical simulations of a spatial prisoner's dilemma game, we find that in the case of a lattice population structure, stronger sanctions and higher sanction efficiency ultimately result in more robust cooperation. In contrast, in the case of a scale-free population structure, higher sanction costs cause the cooperation level to rise.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)239-243
Number of pages5
JournalChaos, solitons and fractals
Volume110
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - May 2018

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All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Statistical and Nonlinear Physics
  • Mathematics(all)
  • Physics and Astronomy(all)
  • Applied Mathematics

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