TY - JOUR
T1 - Scaling the phase-planes of social dilemma strengths shows game-class changes in the five rules governing the evolution of cooperation
AU - Ito, Hiromu
AU - Tanimoto, Jun
N1 - Funding Information:
Data accessibility. The authors declare that all data supporting the findings of this study are available within the article and its electronic supplementary material files or from the corresponding author upon reasonable request. Authors’ contributions. H.I. and J.T. conceived the study and wrote the manuscript. H.I. generated the figures and tables. Competing interests. We declare we have no competing interests. Funding. This work was partially supported by the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS) KAKENHI (nos. 17J06741 and 17H04731) to H.I. Acknowledgements. We thank Prof. Jin Yoshimura for the valuable feedback and discussions.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2018 The Authors.
PY - 2018/10/1
Y1 - 2018/10/1
N2 - Game theory has been extensively applied to help explain how cooperative behaviour is promoted in human and animal societies. How do humans and animals establish reciprocity when confronting a social dilemma? In 2006, Nowak theoretically proved that numerous mechanisms and models for evolving cooperative behaviour reported over the last few decades can be distilled into five reciprocity mechanisms (rules). Additionally, universal scaling parameters were proposed to measure two different types of dilemmas, namely, the gamble-intending dilemma (GID) and risk-averting dilemma (RAD). In this work, by drawing a RAD-GID phase-plane diagram for pair-wise games, we prove that these five rules are indeed quite different for the resolution (relaxation) of the two dilemmas. These diagrams also demonstrate whether and when game-class change (resolution of a dilemma) occurs, thus implying how defectors can be eliminated.
AB - Game theory has been extensively applied to help explain how cooperative behaviour is promoted in human and animal societies. How do humans and animals establish reciprocity when confronting a social dilemma? In 2006, Nowak theoretically proved that numerous mechanisms and models for evolving cooperative behaviour reported over the last few decades can be distilled into five reciprocity mechanisms (rules). Additionally, universal scaling parameters were proposed to measure two different types of dilemmas, namely, the gamble-intending dilemma (GID) and risk-averting dilemma (RAD). In this work, by drawing a RAD-GID phase-plane diagram for pair-wise games, we prove that these five rules are indeed quite different for the resolution (relaxation) of the two dilemmas. These diagrams also demonstrate whether and when game-class change (resolution of a dilemma) occurs, thus implying how defectors can be eliminated.
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U2 - 10.1098/rsos.181085
DO - 10.1098/rsos.181085
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85056797633
VL - 5
JO - Royal Society Open Science
JF - Royal Society Open Science
SN - 2054-5703
IS - 10
M1 - 181085
ER -