Scaling the phase-planes of social dilemma strengths shows game-class changes in the five rules governing the evolution of cooperation

Hiromu Ito, Jun Tanimoto

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

47 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Game theory has been extensively applied to help explain how cooperative behaviour is promoted in human and animal societies. How do humans and animals establish reciprocity when confronting a social dilemma? In 2006, Nowak theoretically proved that numerous mechanisms and models for evolving cooperative behaviour reported over the last few decades can be distilled into five reciprocity mechanisms (rules). Additionally, universal scaling parameters were proposed to measure two different types of dilemmas, namely, the gamble-intending dilemma (GID) and risk-averting dilemma (RAD). In this work, by drawing a RAD-GID phase-plane diagram for pair-wise games, we prove that these five rules are indeed quite different for the resolution (relaxation) of the two dilemmas. These diagrams also demonstrate whether and when game-class change (resolution of a dilemma) occurs, thus implying how defectors can be eliminated.

Original languageEnglish
Article number181085
JournalRoyal Society Open Science
Volume5
Issue number10
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Oct 1 2018

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • General

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