Secure keyword auction: Preserving privacy of bidding prices and CTRs

Yuko Sakurai, Makoto Yokoo, Atsushi Iwasaki, Koutarou Suzuki

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

We develop a secure keyword auction mechanism in which winners and payments are calculated without making bidding prices and CTRs public. First, we show that even if we utilize cryptographic techniques, the auctioneer can learn most bidding prices in existing keyword auction mechanisms, such as the Generalized Second Price (GSP) and the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism. Thus we propose a new auction mechanism by introducing a simple but sufficient payment rule to prevent the leakage of bidding prices. The existing GSP is not strategy-proof, and neither is our mechanism. However, possible manipulations are limited. We also propose a secure keyword auction scheme that securely realizes our new mechanism by utilizing cryptographic techniques.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings - 2009 IEEE/WIC/ACM International Conference on Intelligent Agent Technology, IAT 2009
Pages419-422
Number of pages4
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Dec 1 2009
Event2009 IEEE/WIC/ACM International Conference on Web Intelligence and Intelligent Agent Technology, WI-IAT 2009 - Milano, Italy
Duration: Sep 15 2009Sep 18 2009

Publication series

NameProceedings - 2009 IEEE/WIC/ACM International Conference on Intelligent Agent Technology, IAT 2009
Volume2

Other

Other2009 IEEE/WIC/ACM International Conference on Web Intelligence and Intelligent Agent Technology, WI-IAT 2009
CountryItaly
CityMilano
Period9/15/099/18/09

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Computer Networks and Communications
  • Software

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