Abstract
HMQV is one of the most efficient (provably secure) authenticated key-exchange protocols based on public-key cryptography, and is widely standardized. In spite of its seemingly conceptual simplicity, the HMQV protocol was actually very delicately designed. The provable security of HMQV is conducted in the Canetti-Krawczyk framework (CK-framework, in short), which is quite complicated and lengthy with many subtleties actually buried there. However, lacking a full recognition of the precise yet subtle interplay between HMQV protocol structure and provable security can cause misunderstanding of the HMQV design, and can cause potential flawed design and analysis of HMQV protocol variants. In this work, we explicitly make clear the interplay between HMQV protocol structure and provable security, showing the delicate design of HMQV. We then re-examine the security model and analysis of a recently proposed HMQV protocol variant, specifically, the FHMQV protocol proposed by Sarr et al. in [25]. We clarify the relationship between the traditional CK-framework and the CK-FHMQV security model proposed for FHMQV, and show that CK-HMQV and CK-FHMQV are incomparable. Finally, we make a careful investigation of the CDH-based analysis of FHMQV in the CK-FHMQV model, which was considered to be one of the salient advantages of FHMQV. We identify that the CDH-based security analysis of FHMQV is actually flawed. The flaws identified in the security proof of FHMQV just stem from lacking a full realization of the precise yet subtle interplay, as clarified in this work, between HMQV protocol structure and provable security.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Title of host publication | Information Security and Cryptology - 9th International Conference, Inscrypt 2013, Revised Selected Papers |
| Editors | Moti Yung, Dongdai Lin, Shouhuai Xu, Moti Yung |
| Publisher | Springer Verlag |
| Pages | 255-269 |
| Number of pages | 15 |
| ISBN (Electronic) | 9783319120867 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - Jan 1 2014 |
| Event | 9th China International Conference on Information Security and Cryptology, Inscrypt 2013 - Guangzhou, China Duration: Nov 27 2013 → Nov 30 2013 |
Publication series
| Name | Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) |
|---|---|
| Volume | 8567 |
| ISSN (Print) | 0302-9743 |
| ISSN (Electronic) | 1611-3349 |
Other
| Other | 9th China International Conference on Information Security and Cryptology, Inscrypt 2013 |
|---|---|
| Country | China |
| City | Guangzhou |
| Period | 11/27/13 → 11/30/13 |
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All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Theoretical Computer Science
- Computer Science(all)
Cite this
Security model and analysis of fhmqv, Revisited. / Liu, Shengli; Sakurai, Kouichi; Weng, Jian; Zhang, Fangguo; Zhao, Yunlei; Zhao, Yunlei.
Information Security and Cryptology - 9th International Conference, Inscrypt 2013, Revised Selected Papers. ed. / Moti Yung; Dongdai Lin; Shouhuai Xu; Moti Yung. Springer Verlag, 2014. p. 255-269 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 8567).Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution
}
TY - GEN
T1 - Security model and analysis of fhmqv, Revisited
AU - Liu, Shengli
AU - Sakurai, Kouichi
AU - Weng, Jian
AU - Zhang, Fangguo
AU - Zhao, Yunlei
AU - Zhao, Yunlei
PY - 2014/1/1
Y1 - 2014/1/1
N2 - HMQV is one of the most efficient (provably secure) authenticated key-exchange protocols based on public-key cryptography, and is widely standardized. In spite of its seemingly conceptual simplicity, the HMQV protocol was actually very delicately designed. The provable security of HMQV is conducted in the Canetti-Krawczyk framework (CK-framework, in short), which is quite complicated and lengthy with many subtleties actually buried there. However, lacking a full recognition of the precise yet subtle interplay between HMQV protocol structure and provable security can cause misunderstanding of the HMQV design, and can cause potential flawed design and analysis of HMQV protocol variants. In this work, we explicitly make clear the interplay between HMQV protocol structure and provable security, showing the delicate design of HMQV. We then re-examine the security model and analysis of a recently proposed HMQV protocol variant, specifically, the FHMQV protocol proposed by Sarr et al. in [25]. We clarify the relationship between the traditional CK-framework and the CK-FHMQV security model proposed for FHMQV, and show that CK-HMQV and CK-FHMQV are incomparable. Finally, we make a careful investigation of the CDH-based analysis of FHMQV in the CK-FHMQV model, which was considered to be one of the salient advantages of FHMQV. We identify that the CDH-based security analysis of FHMQV is actually flawed. The flaws identified in the security proof of FHMQV just stem from lacking a full realization of the precise yet subtle interplay, as clarified in this work, between HMQV protocol structure and provable security.
AB - HMQV is one of the most efficient (provably secure) authenticated key-exchange protocols based on public-key cryptography, and is widely standardized. In spite of its seemingly conceptual simplicity, the HMQV protocol was actually very delicately designed. The provable security of HMQV is conducted in the Canetti-Krawczyk framework (CK-framework, in short), which is quite complicated and lengthy with many subtleties actually buried there. However, lacking a full recognition of the precise yet subtle interplay between HMQV protocol structure and provable security can cause misunderstanding of the HMQV design, and can cause potential flawed design and analysis of HMQV protocol variants. In this work, we explicitly make clear the interplay between HMQV protocol structure and provable security, showing the delicate design of HMQV. We then re-examine the security model and analysis of a recently proposed HMQV protocol variant, specifically, the FHMQV protocol proposed by Sarr et al. in [25]. We clarify the relationship between the traditional CK-framework and the CK-FHMQV security model proposed for FHMQV, and show that CK-HMQV and CK-FHMQV are incomparable. Finally, we make a careful investigation of the CDH-based analysis of FHMQV in the CK-FHMQV model, which was considered to be one of the salient advantages of FHMQV. We identify that the CDH-based security analysis of FHMQV is actually flawed. The flaws identified in the security proof of FHMQV just stem from lacking a full realization of the precise yet subtle interplay, as clarified in this work, between HMQV protocol structure and provable security.
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UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84909638553&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/978-3-319-12087-4_16
DO - 10.1007/978-3-319-12087-4_16
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:84909638553
T3 - Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
SP - 255
EP - 269
BT - Information Security and Cryptology - 9th International Conference, Inscrypt 2013, Revised Selected Papers
A2 - Yung, Moti
A2 - Lin, Dongdai
A2 - Xu, Shouhuai
A2 - Yung, Moti
PB - Springer Verlag
ER -