Service exchange problem

Julien Lesca, Taiki Todo

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

2 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In this paper, we study the service exchange problem where each agent is willing to provide her service in order to receive in exchange the service of someone else. We assume that agent's preference depends both on the service that she receives and the person who receives her service. This framework is an extension of the housing market problem to preferences including a degree of externalities. We investigate the complexity of computing an individually rational and Pareto efficient allocation of services to agents for ordinal preferences, and the complexity of computing an allocation which maximizes either the utility sum or the utility of the least served agent for cardinal preferences.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings of the 27th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 2018
EditorsJerome Lang
PublisherInternational Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence
Pages354-360
Number of pages7
ISBN (Electronic)9780999241127
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Jan 1 2018
Event27th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 2018 - Stockholm, Sweden
Duration: Jul 13 2018Jul 19 2018

Publication series

NameIJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Volume2018-July
ISSN (Print)1045-0823

Other

Other27th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 2018
CountrySweden
CityStockholm
Period7/13/187/19/18

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Artificial Intelligence

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