Shareholder Composition and Managerial Compensation

Shinya Shinozaki, Hiroshi Moriyasu, Konari Uchida

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

5 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Stock options are used only sparingly in Japan. Japanese firms are more likely to adopt new stock option plans when they are more (less) owned by arms-length investors (stable and controlling shareholders). Those firms have significantly more independent boards and pay higher dividends surrounding the adoption year than their industry peers. These results suggest that firms adopting stock options endeavor to meet demands for good governance practice from arms-length shareholders and to follow good governance practices in other dimensions. The coexistence of arms-length, stable, and controlling shareholders generates a situation in which stock options are not widely used in Japan.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1719-1738
Number of pages20
JournalJournal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
Volume51
Issue number5
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Oct 1 2016

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Accounting
  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

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