Shareholder Composition and Managerial Compensation

Shinya Shinozaki, Hiroshi Moriyasu, Konari Uchida

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

3 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Stock options are used only sparingly in Japan. Japanese firms are more likely to adopt new stock option plans when they are more (less) owned by arms-length investors (stable and controlling shareholders). Those firms have significantly more independent boards and pay higher dividends surrounding the adoption year than their industry peers. These results suggest that firms adopting stock options endeavor to meet demands for good governance practice from arms-length shareholders and to follow good governance practices in other dimensions. The coexistence of arms-length, stable, and controlling shareholders generates a situation in which stock options are not widely used in Japan.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1719-1738
Number of pages20
JournalJournal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
Volume51
Issue number5
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Oct 1 2016

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Stock options
Shareholders
Managerial compensation
Japan
Controlling shareholders
Dividends
Investors
Industry
Coexistence
Peers
Japanese firms

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Accounting
  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

Cite this

Shareholder Composition and Managerial Compensation. / Shinozaki, Shinya; Moriyasu, Hiroshi; Uchida, Konari.

In: Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 51, No. 5, 01.10.2016, p. 1719-1738.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Shinozaki, Shinya ; Moriyasu, Hiroshi ; Uchida, Konari. / Shareholder Composition and Managerial Compensation. In: Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis. 2016 ; Vol. 51, No. 5. pp. 1719-1738.
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