### Abstract

We study the problem where a group of agents need to choose from a finite set of social outcomes. We assume every agent's valuation for every outcome is bounded and the bounds are public information. For our model, no mechanism simultaneously satisfies strategy-proofness, individual rationality, non-deficit, and efficiency. In light of this, we aim to design mechanisms that are strategy-proof, individually rational, non-deficit, and minimize the worst-case efficiency loss. We propose a family of mechanisms called the shifted Groves mechanisms, which are generalizations of the Groves mechanisms. We first show that if there exist mechanisms that are strategy-proof, individually rational, and non-deficit, then there exist shifted Groves mechanisms with these properties. Our main result is an Automated Mechanism Design (AMD) approach for identifying the (unique) optimal shifted Groves mechanism, which minimizes the worst-case efficiency loss among all shifted Groves mechanisms. Finally, we prove that the optimal shifted Groves mechanism is globally optimal among all deterministic mechanisms that are strategy-proof, individually rational, and non-deficit.

Original language | English |
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Title of host publication | AAMAS 2015 - Proceedings of the 2015 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems |

Publisher | International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS) |

Pages | 347-355 |

Number of pages | 9 |

Volume | 1 |

ISBN (Electronic) | 9781450337694 |

Publication status | Published - 2015 |

Event | 14th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2015 - Istanbul, Turkey Duration: May 4 2015 → May 8 2015 |

### Other

Other | 14th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2015 |
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Country | Turkey |

City | Istanbul |

Period | 5/4/15 → 5/8/15 |

### All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

- Artificial Intelligence
- Software
- Control and Systems Engineering

### Cite this

*AAMAS 2015 - Proceedings of the 2015 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems*(Vol. 1, pp. 347-355). International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS).

**Social decision with minimal efficiency loss : An automated mechanism design approach.** / Guo, Mingyu; Shen, Hong; Todo, Taiki; Sakurai, Yuko; Yokoo, Makoto.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

*AAMAS 2015 - Proceedings of the 2015 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems.*vol. 1, International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS), pp. 347-355, 14th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2015, Istanbul, Turkey, 5/4/15.

}

TY - GEN

T1 - Social decision with minimal efficiency loss

T2 - An automated mechanism design approach

AU - Guo, Mingyu

AU - Shen, Hong

AU - Todo, Taiki

AU - Sakurai, Yuko

AU - Yokoo, Makoto

PY - 2015

Y1 - 2015

N2 - We study the problem where a group of agents need to choose from a finite set of social outcomes. We assume every agent's valuation for every outcome is bounded and the bounds are public information. For our model, no mechanism simultaneously satisfies strategy-proofness, individual rationality, non-deficit, and efficiency. In light of this, we aim to design mechanisms that are strategy-proof, individually rational, non-deficit, and minimize the worst-case efficiency loss. We propose a family of mechanisms called the shifted Groves mechanisms, which are generalizations of the Groves mechanisms. We first show that if there exist mechanisms that are strategy-proof, individually rational, and non-deficit, then there exist shifted Groves mechanisms with these properties. Our main result is an Automated Mechanism Design (AMD) approach for identifying the (unique) optimal shifted Groves mechanism, which minimizes the worst-case efficiency loss among all shifted Groves mechanisms. Finally, we prove that the optimal shifted Groves mechanism is globally optimal among all deterministic mechanisms that are strategy-proof, individually rational, and non-deficit.

AB - We study the problem where a group of agents need to choose from a finite set of social outcomes. We assume every agent's valuation for every outcome is bounded and the bounds are public information. For our model, no mechanism simultaneously satisfies strategy-proofness, individual rationality, non-deficit, and efficiency. In light of this, we aim to design mechanisms that are strategy-proof, individually rational, non-deficit, and minimize the worst-case efficiency loss. We propose a family of mechanisms called the shifted Groves mechanisms, which are generalizations of the Groves mechanisms. We first show that if there exist mechanisms that are strategy-proof, individually rational, and non-deficit, then there exist shifted Groves mechanisms with these properties. Our main result is an Automated Mechanism Design (AMD) approach for identifying the (unique) optimal shifted Groves mechanism, which minimizes the worst-case efficiency loss among all shifted Groves mechanisms. Finally, we prove that the optimal shifted Groves mechanism is globally optimal among all deterministic mechanisms that are strategy-proof, individually rational, and non-deficit.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84944681151&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84944681151&partnerID=8YFLogxK

M3 - Conference contribution

AN - SCOPUS:84944681151

VL - 1

SP - 347

EP - 355

BT - AAMAS 2015 - Proceedings of the 2015 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems

PB - International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS)

ER -