Social diffusive impact analysis based on evolutionary computations for a novel car navigation system sharing individual information in urban traffic systems

Jun Tanimoto, Hiroki Sagara

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

4 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In this study, an experiment to establish a model for human-environment social systems, a multi-agent simulation model to deal with urban traffic congestion problems involving automobiles embedded with several strategies of car navigation systems (CNS), is presented. A shortest time route with route information sharing strategy (ST-RIS) is believed to be one of the solutions for a novel CNS based on bilateral information shared among automobile agents. We assume several strategies including ST-RIS for agents, which are defined differently in terms of their information-handling process. The question of which strategy is most appropriate for solving urban traffic congestion can be seen as a social dilemma, because social holistic utility may conflict with an agent's individual utility. The presented model shows that this social dilemma can be observed as a typical chicken-type dilemma, or as a typical minority game, where an agent who has adopted a minority strategy can earn more utility compared to when other strategies are used. Consequently, the model has illustrated that shortest time route with partial route information sharing strategy (ST-pRIS), which is an advanced strategic form of ST-RIS in which only partial information is shared among agents, has moderate potential to be diffused in a society from the viewpoint of the evolutionary game theory.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)711-725
Number of pages15
JournalJournal of Navigation
Volume64
Issue number4
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Oct 1 2011

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social impact
Navigation systems
Evolutionary algorithms
navigation
automobile
Railroad cars
traffic congestion
Traffic congestion
Automobiles
game theory
evolutionary theory
Game theory
urban traffic
analysis
simulation
experiment
Experiments
minority

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Oceanography
  • Ocean Engineering

Cite this

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abstract = "In this study, an experiment to establish a model for human-environment social systems, a multi-agent simulation model to deal with urban traffic congestion problems involving automobiles embedded with several strategies of car navigation systems (CNS), is presented. A shortest time route with route information sharing strategy (ST-RIS) is believed to be one of the solutions for a novel CNS based on bilateral information shared among automobile agents. We assume several strategies including ST-RIS for agents, which are defined differently in terms of their information-handling process. The question of which strategy is most appropriate for solving urban traffic congestion can be seen as a social dilemma, because social holistic utility may conflict with an agent's individual utility. The presented model shows that this social dilemma can be observed as a typical chicken-type dilemma, or as a typical minority game, where an agent who has adopted a minority strategy can earn more utility compared to when other strategies are used. Consequently, the model has illustrated that shortest time route with partial route information sharing strategy (ST-pRIS), which is an advanced strategic form of ST-RIS in which only partial information is shared among agents, has moderate potential to be diffused in a society from the viewpoint of the evolutionary game theory.",
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