### Abstract

In this paper, we study some RSA-based semantically secure encryption schemes (IND-CPA) in the standard model. We first derive the exactly tight one-wayness of Rabin-Paillier encryption scheme which assumes that factoring Blum integers is hard. We next propose the first IND-CPA scheme whose one-wayness is equivalent to factoring general n = pq (not factoring Blum integers). Our reductions of one-wayness are very tight because they require only one decryption-oracle query.

Original language | English |
---|---|

Pages (from-to) | 19-36 |

Number of pages | 18 |

Journal | Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) |

Volume | 2894 |

Publication status | Published - Dec 1 2003 |

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### All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

- Theoretical Computer Science
- Computer Science(all)

### Cite this

*Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)*,

*2894*, 19-36.

**Some RSA-based encryption schemes with tight security reduction.** / Kurosawa, Kaoru; Takagi, Tsuyoshi.

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article

*Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)*, vol. 2894, pp. 19-36.

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Some RSA-based encryption schemes with tight security reduction

AU - Kurosawa, Kaoru

AU - Takagi, Tsuyoshi

PY - 2003/12/1

Y1 - 2003/12/1

N2 - In this paper, we study some RSA-based semantically secure encryption schemes (IND-CPA) in the standard model. We first derive the exactly tight one-wayness of Rabin-Paillier encryption scheme which assumes that factoring Blum integers is hard. We next propose the first IND-CPA scheme whose one-wayness is equivalent to factoring general n = pq (not factoring Blum integers). Our reductions of one-wayness are very tight because they require only one decryption-oracle query.

AB - In this paper, we study some RSA-based semantically secure encryption schemes (IND-CPA) in the standard model. We first derive the exactly tight one-wayness of Rabin-Paillier encryption scheme which assumes that factoring Blum integers is hard. We next propose the first IND-CPA scheme whose one-wayness is equivalent to factoring general n = pq (not factoring Blum integers). Our reductions of one-wayness are very tight because they require only one decryption-oracle query.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=0345490615&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=0345490615&partnerID=8YFLogxK

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:0345490615

VL - 2894

SP - 19

EP - 36

JO - Lecture Notes in Computer Science

JF - Lecture Notes in Computer Science

SN - 0302-9743

ER -