Spatial reciprocity for discrete, continuous and mixed strategy setups

Satoshi Kokubo, Zhen Wang, Jun Tanimoto

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

20 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

The existence of cooperation in the social dilemma has been extensively studied based on spatial structure populations, namely, the so-called spatial reciprocity. However, vast majority of existing works just simply presume that agents can offer the discrete choice: either the cooperative (C) or defective (D) strategy, which, to some extent, seems unrealistic in the empirical observations since actual options might be continuous, mixed rather than discrete. Here, we propose discrete, continuous and mixed strategy setups in the social dilemma games and further explore their performance on network populations. Interestingly, it is unveiled that there is actually considerable inconsistency in terms of equilibrium among different strategy games. Furthermore, we reveal how different cooperative arrangements among these three strategy setups can be established, depending on whether the presumed dilemma subclass is a boundary game between prisoner's dilemma game and Chicken game or between prisoner's dilemma game and Stag-Hunt game.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)552-568
Number of pages17
JournalApplied Mathematics and Computation
Volume259
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - May 15 2015

Fingerprint

Mixed Strategy
Reciprocity
Game
Social Dilemma
Prisoner's Dilemma Game
Discrete Choice
Dilemma
Spatial Structure
Inconsistency
Arrangement
Strategy

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Applied Mathematics
  • Computational Mathematics

Cite this

Spatial reciprocity for discrete, continuous and mixed strategy setups. / Kokubo, Satoshi; Wang, Zhen; Tanimoto, Jun.

In: Applied Mathematics and Computation, Vol. 259, 15.05.2015, p. 552-568.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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