Stable and envy-free partitions in hedonic games

Nathanaël Barrot, Makoto Yokoo

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

In this paper, we study coalition formation in hedonic games through the fairness criterion of envy-freeness. Since the grand coalition is always envy-free, we focus on the conjunction of envy-freeness with stability notions. We first show that, in symmetric and additively separable hedonic games, an individually stable and justified envy-free partition may not exist and deciding its existence is NP-complete. Then, we prove that the top responsiveness property guarantees the existence of a Pareto optimal, individually stable, and envy-free partition, but it is not sufficient for the conjunction of core stability and envy-freeness. Finally, under bottom responsiveness, we show that deciding the existence of an individually stable and envy-free partition is NP-complete, but a Pareto optimal and justified envy-free partition always exists.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings of the 28th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 2019
EditorsSarit Kraus
PublisherInternational Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence
Pages67-73
Number of pages7
ISBN (Electronic)9780999241141
Publication statusPublished - Jan 1 2019
Event28th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 2019 - Macao, China
Duration: Aug 10 2019Aug 16 2019

Publication series

NameIJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Volume2019-August
ISSN (Print)1045-0823

Conference

Conference28th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 2019
CountryChina
CityMacao
Period8/10/198/16/19

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Artificial Intelligence

Cite this

Barrot, N., & Yokoo, M. (2019). Stable and envy-free partitions in hedonic games. In S. Kraus (Ed.), Proceedings of the 28th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 2019 (pp. 67-73). (IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence; Vol. 2019-August). International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence.

Stable and envy-free partitions in hedonic games. / Barrot, Nathanaël; Yokoo, Makoto.

Proceedings of the 28th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 2019. ed. / Sarit Kraus. International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence, 2019. p. 67-73 (IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence; Vol. 2019-August).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Barrot, N & Yokoo, M 2019, Stable and envy-free partitions in hedonic games. in S Kraus (ed.), Proceedings of the 28th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 2019. IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, vol. 2019-August, International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence, pp. 67-73, 28th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 2019, Macao, China, 8/10/19.
Barrot N, Yokoo M. Stable and envy-free partitions in hedonic games. In Kraus S, editor, Proceedings of the 28th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 2019. International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence. 2019. p. 67-73. (IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence).
Barrot, Nathanaël ; Yokoo, Makoto. / Stable and envy-free partitions in hedonic games. Proceedings of the 28th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 2019. editor / Sarit Kraus. International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence, 2019. pp. 67-73 (IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence).
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