Stable and envy-free partitions in hedonic games

Nathanaël Barrot, Makoto Yokoo

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

In this paper, we study coalition formation in hedonic games through the fairness criterion of envy-freeness. Since the grand coalition is always envy-free, we focus on the conjunction of envy-freeness with stability notions. We first show that, in symmetric and additively separable hedonic games, an individually stable and justified envy-free partition may not exist and deciding its existence is NP-complete. Then, we prove that the top responsiveness property guarantees the existence of a Pareto optimal, individually stable, and envy-free partition, but it is not sufficient for the conjunction of core stability and envy-freeness. Finally, under bottom responsiveness, we show that deciding the existence of an individually stable and envy-free partition is NP-complete, but a Pareto optimal and justified envy-free partition always exists.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings of the 28th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 2019
EditorsSarit Kraus
PublisherInternational Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence
Pages67-73
Number of pages7
ISBN (Electronic)9780999241141
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2019
Event28th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 2019 - Macao, China
Duration: Aug 10 2019Aug 16 2019

Publication series

NameIJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Volume2019-August
ISSN (Print)1045-0823

Conference

Conference28th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 2019
CountryChina
CityMacao
Period8/10/198/16/19

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Artificial Intelligence

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