Stable matchings with ties, master preference lists, and matroid constraints

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

6 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In this paper, we consider a matroid generalization of the hospitals/residents problem with ties and master lists. In this model, the capacity constraints for hospitals are generalized to matroid constraints. By generalizing the algorithms of O’Malley for the hospitals/residents problem with ties and master lists, we give polynomial-time algorithms for deciding whether there exist a super-stable matching and a strongly stable matching in our model, and finding such matchings if they exist.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationAlgorithmic Game Theory - 8th International Symposium, SAGT 2015
EditorsMartin Hoefer, Martin Hoefer
PublisherSpringer Verlag
Pages3-14
Number of pages12
ISBN (Print)9783662484326
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2015
Event8th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, SAGT 2015 - Saarbrucken, Germany
Duration: Sep 28 2015Sep 30 2015

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume9347
ISSN (Print)0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)1611-3349

Other

Other8th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, SAGT 2015
CountryGermany
CitySaarbrucken
Period9/28/159/30/15

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Theoretical Computer Science
  • Computer Science(all)

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