Strategic issues in college admissions with score-limits

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

We consider strategic problems in college admissions with score-limits introduced by Biró and Kiselgof. We first consider the problem of deciding whether a given applicant can cheat the algorithm of Biró and Kiselgof so that this applicant is assigned to a more preferable college. We prove its polynomial-time solvability. In addition, we consider the situation in which all applicants strategically behave. We prove that a Nash equilibrium always exists, and we can find one in polynomial time.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)105-108
Number of pages4
JournalOperations Research Letters
Volume45
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Mar 1 2017

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Software
  • Management Science and Operations Research
  • Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering
  • Applied Mathematics

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