Strategy-proof and non-wasteful multi-unit auction via social network

Takehiro Kawasaki, Nathanaël Barrot, Seiji Takanashi, Taiki Todo, Makoto Yokoo

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

Auctions via social network, pioneered by Li et al. (2017), have been attracting considerable attention in the literature of mechanism design for auctions. However, no known mechanism has satisfied strategy-proofness, non-deficit, non-wastefulness, and individual rationality for the multi-unit unit-demand auction, except for some naïve ones. In this paper, we first propose a mechanism that satisfies all the above properties. We then make a comprehensive comparison with two naïve mechanisms, showing that the proposed mechanism dominates them in social surplus, seller’s revenue, and incentive of buyers for truth-telling. We also analyze the characteristics of the social surplus and the revenue achieved by the proposed mechanism, including the constant approximability of the worst-case efficiency loss and the complexity of optimizing revenue from the seller’s perspective.

Original languageEnglish
JournalUnknown Journal
Publication statusPublished - Nov 20 2019

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • General

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