Strategy/false-name proof protocols for combinatorial multi-attribute procurement auction: Handling arbitrary utility of the buyer

Takayuki Suyama, Makoto Yokoo

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

In this paper, we develop new protocols for a combinatorial, multi-attribute procurement auction in which each sales item (task) is defined by several attributes called quality, the buyer is the auctioneer (e.g., a government), and the sellers are the bidders. Furthermore, there exist multiple tasks, and both buyer and sellers can have arbitrary (e.g., complementary/substitutable) preferences on a bundle of tasks. In this setting, there is a chance that a VCG protocol cannot satisfy Individual Rationality (IR) for the buyer, i.e., the buyer's utility can be negative. We show that if a surplus function is concave, then the VCG protocol satisfies IR and the protocol is also false-name-proof, i.e., using multiple identifiers provides no advantage. Furthermore, we present a modification of the VCG protocol that satisfies IR even if the concavity condition is not satisfied. The key idea of this protocol is to introduce a special type of bidder called the reference bidder. We assume that the auctioneer knows the upper-bound of the reference bidder's cost. Introducing such a reference bidder is similar to setting reservation prices in standard combinatorial auctions. Furthermore, we develop a new false-name-proof protocol that is based on the idea of the Leveled Division Set (LDS) protocol.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationInternet and Network Economics - First International Workshop, WINE 2005, Proceedings
Pages278-287
Number of pages10
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Dec 1 2005
Event1st International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics, WINE 2005 - Hong Kong, China
Duration: Dec 15 2005Dec 17 2005

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume3828 LNCS
ISSN (Print)0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)1611-3349

Other

Other1st International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics, WINE 2005
CountryChina
CityHong Kong
Period12/15/0512/17/05

Fingerprint

Auctions
Sales
Attribute
Arbitrary
Costs
Rationality
Combinatorial Auctions
False
Strategy
Concavity
Reservation
Division
Bundle
Upper bound

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Theoretical Computer Science
  • Computer Science(all)

Cite this

Suyama, T., & Yokoo, M. (2005). Strategy/false-name proof protocols for combinatorial multi-attribute procurement auction: Handling arbitrary utility of the buyer. In Internet and Network Economics - First International Workshop, WINE 2005, Proceedings (pp. 278-287). (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 3828 LNCS). https://doi.org/10.1007/11600930_27

Strategy/false-name proof protocols for combinatorial multi-attribute procurement auction : Handling arbitrary utility of the buyer. / Suyama, Takayuki; Yokoo, Makoto.

Internet and Network Economics - First International Workshop, WINE 2005, Proceedings. 2005. p. 278-287 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 3828 LNCS).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Suyama, T & Yokoo, M 2005, Strategy/false-name proof protocols for combinatorial multi-attribute procurement auction: Handling arbitrary utility of the buyer. in Internet and Network Economics - First International Workshop, WINE 2005, Proceedings. Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), vol. 3828 LNCS, pp. 278-287, 1st International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics, WINE 2005, Hong Kong, China, 12/15/05. https://doi.org/10.1007/11600930_27
Suyama T, Yokoo M. Strategy/false-name proof protocols for combinatorial multi-attribute procurement auction: Handling arbitrary utility of the buyer. In Internet and Network Economics - First International Workshop, WINE 2005, Proceedings. 2005. p. 278-287. (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)). https://doi.org/10.1007/11600930_27
Suyama, Takayuki ; Yokoo, Makoto. / Strategy/false-name proof protocols for combinatorial multi-attribute procurement auction : Handling arbitrary utility of the buyer. Internet and Network Economics - First International Workshop, WINE 2005, Proceedings. 2005. pp. 278-287 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)).
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