Strategyproof exchange with multiple private endowments

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

10 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We study a mechanism design problem for exchange economies where each agent is initially endowed with a set of indivisible goods and side payments arc not allowed. We assume each agent can withhold some endowments. as well as misreport her preference. Under this assumption, strategyproofness requires that for each agent, reporting her true preference with revealing all her endowments is a dominant strategy, and thus implies individual rationality. Our objective in this paper is to analyze the effect of such private ownership in exchange economies with multiple endowments. As fundamental results, we first show that the revelation principle holds under a natural assumption and that strategyproofness and Pareto efficiency are incompatible even under the lexicographic preference domain. We then propose a class of exchange rules, each of which has a corresponding directed graph to prescribe possible trades, and provide necessary and sufficient conditions on the graph structure so that they satisfy strategyproofness.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings of the 28th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence and the 26th Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence Conference and the 5th Symposium on Educational Advances in Artificial Intelligence
PublisherAI Access Foundation
Pages805-811
Number of pages7
ISBN (Electronic)9781577356776
Publication statusPublished - Jan 1 2014
Event28th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2014, 26th Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence Conference, IAAI 2014 and the 5th Symposium on Educational Advances in Artificial Intelligence, EAAI 2014 - Quebec City, Canada
Duration: Jul 27 2014Jul 31 2014

Publication series

NameProceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Volume1

Other

Other28th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2014, 26th Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence Conference, IAAI 2014 and the 5th Symposium on Educational Advances in Artificial Intelligence, EAAI 2014
CountryCanada
CityQuebec City
Period7/27/147/31/14

Fingerprint

Directed graphs

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Software
  • Artificial Intelligence

Cite this

Todo, T., Sun, H., & Yokoo, M. (2014). Strategyproof exchange with multiple private endowments. In Proceedings of the 28th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence and the 26th Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence Conference and the 5th Symposium on Educational Advances in Artificial Intelligence (pp. 805-811). (Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence; Vol. 1). AI Access Foundation.

Strategyproof exchange with multiple private endowments. / Todo, Taiki; Sun, Haixin; Yokoo, Makoto.

Proceedings of the 28th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence and the 26th Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence Conference and the 5th Symposium on Educational Advances in Artificial Intelligence. AI Access Foundation, 2014. p. 805-811 (Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence; Vol. 1).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Todo, T, Sun, H & Yokoo, M 2014, Strategyproof exchange with multiple private endowments. in Proceedings of the 28th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence and the 26th Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence Conference and the 5th Symposium on Educational Advances in Artificial Intelligence. Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, vol. 1, AI Access Foundation, pp. 805-811, 28th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2014, 26th Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence Conference, IAAI 2014 and the 5th Symposium on Educational Advances in Artificial Intelligence, EAAI 2014, Quebec City, Canada, 7/27/14.
Todo T, Sun H, Yokoo M. Strategyproof exchange with multiple private endowments. In Proceedings of the 28th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence and the 26th Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence Conference and the 5th Symposium on Educational Advances in Artificial Intelligence. AI Access Foundation. 2014. p. 805-811. (Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence).
Todo, Taiki ; Sun, Haixin ; Yokoo, Makoto. / Strategyproof exchange with multiple private endowments. Proceedings of the 28th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence and the 26th Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence Conference and the 5th Symposium on Educational Advances in Artificial Intelligence. AI Access Foundation, 2014. pp. 805-811 (Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence).
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