Strategyproof matching with minimum quotas

Daniel Fragiadakis, Atsushi Iwasaki, Peter Troyan, Suguru Ueda, Makoto Yokoo

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

32 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We study matching markets in which institutions may have minimum and maximum quotas. Minimum quotas are important in many settings, such as hospital residency matching, military cadet matching, and school choice, but current mechanisms are unable to accommodate them, leading to the use of ad hoc solutions. We introduce two new classes of strategyproof mechanisms that allow for minimum quotas as an explicit input and show that our mechanisms improve welfare relative to existing approaches. Because minimum quotas cause a theoretical incompatibility between standard fairness and nonwastefulness properties, we introduce new second-best axioms and show that they are satisfied by our mechanisms. Last, we use simulations to quantify (1) the magnitude of the potential efficiency gains from our mechanisms and (2) how far the resulting assignments are from the first-best definitions of fairness and nonwastefulness. Combining both the theoretical and simulation results, we argue that our mechanisms will improve the performance of matching markets with minimum quota constraints in practice.

Original languageEnglish
Article number6
JournalACM Transactions on Economics and Computation
Volume4
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Dec 1 2015

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Fairness
Welfare
Axioms
Military
Strategy-proof
Simulation
Quantify
Assignment
Market
Matching markets
Class
Standards
School choice
Efficiency gains
Incompatibility
Ad hoc

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Computer Science (miscellaneous)
  • Statistics and Probability
  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Marketing
  • Computational Mathematics

Cite this

Strategyproof matching with minimum quotas. / Fragiadakis, Daniel; Iwasaki, Atsushi; Troyan, Peter; Ueda, Suguru; Yokoo, Makoto.

In: ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation, Vol. 4, No. 1, 6, 01.12.2015.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Fragiadakis, Daniel ; Iwasaki, Atsushi ; Troyan, Peter ; Ueda, Suguru ; Yokoo, Makoto. / Strategyproof matching with minimum quotas. In: ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation. 2015 ; Vol. 4, No. 1.
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