Strategyproof matching with regional minimum and maximum quotas

Masahiro Goto, Atsushi Iwasaki, Yujiro Kawasaki, Ryoji Kurata, Yosuke Yasuda, Makoto Yokoo

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

20 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper considers matching problems with individual/regional minimum/maximum quotas. Although such quotas are relevant in many real-world settings, there is a lack of strategyproof mechanisms that take such quotas into account. We first show that without any restrictions on the regional structure, checking the existence of a feasible matching that satisfies all quotas is NP-complete. Then, assuming that regions have a hierarchical structure (i.e., a tree), we show that checking the existence of a feasible matching can be done in time linear in the number of regions. We develop two strategyproof matching mechanisms based on the Deferred Acceptance mechanism (DA), which we call Priority List based Deferred Acceptance with Regional minimum and maximum Quotas (PLDA-RQ) and Round-robin Selection Deferred Acceptance with Regional minimum and maximum Quotas (RSDA-RQ). When regional quotas are imposed, a stable matching may no longer exist since fairness and nonwastefulness, which compose stability, are incompatible. We show that both mechanisms are fair. As a result, they are inevitably wasteful. We show that the two mechanisms satisfy different versions of nonwastefulness respectively; each is weaker than the original nonwastefulness. Moreover, we compare our mechanisms with an artificial cap mechanism via simulation experiments, which illustrate that they have a clear advantage in terms of nonwastefulness and student welfare.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)40-57
Number of pages18
JournalArtificial Intelligence
Volume235
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Jun 1 2016

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Students
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acceptance
regional structure
fairness
welfare
simulation
lack
experiment
Acceptance
student

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Language and Linguistics
  • Linguistics and Language
  • Artificial Intelligence

Cite this

Strategyproof matching with regional minimum and maximum quotas. / Goto, Masahiro; Iwasaki, Atsushi; Kawasaki, Yujiro; Kurata, Ryoji; Yasuda, Yosuke; Yokoo, Makoto.

In: Artificial Intelligence, Vol. 235, 01.06.2016, p. 40-57.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Goto, Masahiro ; Iwasaki, Atsushi ; Kawasaki, Yujiro ; Kurata, Ryoji ; Yasuda, Yosuke ; Yokoo, Makoto. / Strategyproof matching with regional minimum and maximum quotas. In: Artificial Intelligence. 2016 ; Vol. 235. pp. 40-57.
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