TY - GEN
T1 - Studying on economic-inspired mechanisms for routing and forwarding in wireless ad hoc network
AU - Wang, Yufeng
AU - Hori, Yoshiaki
AU - Sakurai, Kouichi
PY - 2007/10/29
Y1 - 2007/10/29
N2 - Considering the fact that there exist information asymmetry (hidden information) in routing phase, and moral hazard (hidden action) in forwarding phase in autonomous Ad hoc network, this paper argues that economic-based mechanisms play both a signaling and a sanctioning role, which reveal the node's true forwarding cost in routing phase while provide incentives to nodes to exert reasonable effort in forwarding phase, that is, the role of economicinspired mechanisms in information asymmetry is to induce learning whereas the role of such mechanisms in moral hazard settings is to constrain behavior. Specifically, this paper conducts the following works: considering the mutually dependent link cost, we demonstrate that, for each participant, truth-telling is the risk dominant strategy in VCG-like routing mechanism based on analysis of extensive game form. Then, Individual rationality (IR) and Incentive Compatibility (IC) constraints are formally offered, which should be satisfied by any game theoretical routing and forwarding scheme. And different solution concepts are investigated to characterize the economic meanings of two kind forwarding approaches, that is, Nash equilibrium with no per-hop monitoring and dominant strategy equilibrium with per-hop monitoring.
AB - Considering the fact that there exist information asymmetry (hidden information) in routing phase, and moral hazard (hidden action) in forwarding phase in autonomous Ad hoc network, this paper argues that economic-based mechanisms play both a signaling and a sanctioning role, which reveal the node's true forwarding cost in routing phase while provide incentives to nodes to exert reasonable effort in forwarding phase, that is, the role of economicinspired mechanisms in information asymmetry is to induce learning whereas the role of such mechanisms in moral hazard settings is to constrain behavior. Specifically, this paper conducts the following works: considering the mutually dependent link cost, we demonstrate that, for each participant, truth-telling is the risk dominant strategy in VCG-like routing mechanism based on analysis of extensive game form. Then, Individual rationality (IR) and Incentive Compatibility (IC) constraints are formally offered, which should be satisfied by any game theoretical routing and forwarding scheme. And different solution concepts are investigated to characterize the economic meanings of two kind forwarding approaches, that is, Nash equilibrium with no per-hop monitoring and dominant strategy equilibrium with per-hop monitoring.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=35448940831&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=35448940831&partnerID=8YFLogxK
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:35448940831
SN - 3540725032
SN - 9783540725039
T3 - Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
SP - 362
EP - 373
BT - Theory and Applications of Models of Computation - 4th International Conference, TAMC 2007, Proceedings
T2 - 4th International Conference on Theory and Applications of Models of Computation, TAMC 2007
Y2 - 22 May 2007 through 25 May 2007
ER -