The effect of assortative mixing on emerging cooperation in an evolutionary network game

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

3 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

A series of numerical experiments using a co-evolutionary model for both networks and strategies for 2 - 2 games was carried out. It was proven that there was an interesting relation between assortative mixing of the evolved network and emerging cooperation. In the Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) game class, the evolutionary trail for a weak dilemma game leads to an assortative mixing network, and attains cooperative situation easily. A game implemented with a stronger dilemma, however, makes the network very heterogeneous, featuring a negative assortative coefficient to solve the dilemma situation. This implies that the dilemma strength in PD significantly affects the direction the assortative coefficient takes during evolutionary processes in theco-evolution model.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publication2009 IEEE Congress on Evolutionary Computation, CEC 2009
Pages487-493
Number of pages7
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2009
Event2009 IEEE Congress on Evolutionary Computation, CEC 2009 - Trondheim, Norway
Duration: May 18 2009May 21 2009

Other

Other2009 IEEE Congress on Evolutionary Computation, CEC 2009
CountryNorway
CityTrondheim
Period5/18/095/21/09

Fingerprint

Dilemma
Game
Prisoner's Dilemma Game
Prisoners' Dilemma
Coefficient
Experiments
Numerical Experiment
Imply
Series
Model

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Artificial Intelligence
  • Computational Theory and Mathematics
  • Theoretical Computer Science

Cite this

Tanimoto, J. (2009). The effect of assortative mixing on emerging cooperation in an evolutionary network game. In 2009 IEEE Congress on Evolutionary Computation, CEC 2009 (pp. 487-493). [4982985] https://doi.org/10.1109/CEC.2009.4982985

The effect of assortative mixing on emerging cooperation in an evolutionary network game. / Tanimoto, Jun.

2009 IEEE Congress on Evolutionary Computation, CEC 2009. 2009. p. 487-493 4982985.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Tanimoto, J 2009, The effect of assortative mixing on emerging cooperation in an evolutionary network game. in 2009 IEEE Congress on Evolutionary Computation, CEC 2009., 4982985, pp. 487-493, 2009 IEEE Congress on Evolutionary Computation, CEC 2009, Trondheim, Norway, 5/18/09. https://doi.org/10.1109/CEC.2009.4982985
Tanimoto, Jun. / The effect of assortative mixing on emerging cooperation in an evolutionary network game. 2009 IEEE Congress on Evolutionary Computation, CEC 2009. 2009. pp. 487-493
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