The effect of false-name bids in combinatorial auctions: New fraud in internet auctions

Makoto Yokoo, Yuko Sakurai, Shigeo Matsubara

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

172 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We examine the effect of false-name bids on combinatorial auction protocols. False-name bids are bids submitted by a single bidder using multiple identifiers such as multiple e-mail addresses. The obtained results are summarized as follows: (1) the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism, which is strategy-proof and Pareto efficient when there exists no false-name bid, is not false-name-proof; (2) there exists no false-name-proof combinatorial auction protocol that satisfies Pareto efficiency; (3) one sufficient condition where the VCG mechanism is false-name-proof is identified, i.e., the concavity of a surplus function over bidders.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)174-188
Number of pages15
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Volume46
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Jan 2004

Fingerprint

Fraud
Internet auctions
Combinatorial auctions
Bid
Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism
Strategy-proof
Pareto
Electronic mail
Pareto efficiency
Concavity
Surplus

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

Cite this

The effect of false-name bids in combinatorial auctions : New fraud in internet auctions. / Yokoo, Makoto; Sakurai, Yuko; Matsubara, Shigeo.

In: Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 46, No. 1, 01.2004, p. 174-188.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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