Abstract
We examine the effect of false-name bids on combinatorial auction protocols. False-name bids are bids submitted by a single bidder using multiple identifiers such as multiple e-mail addresses. The obtained results are summarized as follows: (1) the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism, which is strategy-proof and Pareto efficient when there exists no false-name bid, is not false-name-proof; (2) there exists no false-name-proof combinatorial auction protocol that satisfies Pareto efficiency; (3) one sufficient condition where the VCG mechanism is false-name-proof is identified, i.e., the concavity of a surplus function over bidders.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 174-188 |
| Number of pages | 15 |
| Journal | Games and Economic Behavior |
| Volume | 46 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - Jan 2004 |
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All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Finance
- Economics and Econometrics
Cite this
The effect of false-name bids in combinatorial auctions : New fraud in internet auctions. / Yokoo, Makoto; Sakurai, Yuko; Matsubara, Shigeo.
In: Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 46, No. 1, 01.2004, p. 174-188.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - The effect of false-name bids in combinatorial auctions
T2 - New fraud in internet auctions
AU - Yokoo, Makoto
AU - Sakurai, Yuko
AU - Matsubara, Shigeo
PY - 2004/1
Y1 - 2004/1
N2 - We examine the effect of false-name bids on combinatorial auction protocols. False-name bids are bids submitted by a single bidder using multiple identifiers such as multiple e-mail addresses. The obtained results are summarized as follows: (1) the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism, which is strategy-proof and Pareto efficient when there exists no false-name bid, is not false-name-proof; (2) there exists no false-name-proof combinatorial auction protocol that satisfies Pareto efficiency; (3) one sufficient condition where the VCG mechanism is false-name-proof is identified, i.e., the concavity of a surplus function over bidders.
AB - We examine the effect of false-name bids on combinatorial auction protocols. False-name bids are bids submitted by a single bidder using multiple identifiers such as multiple e-mail addresses. The obtained results are summarized as follows: (1) the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism, which is strategy-proof and Pareto efficient when there exists no false-name bid, is not false-name-proof; (2) there exists no false-name-proof combinatorial auction protocol that satisfies Pareto efficiency; (3) one sufficient condition where the VCG mechanism is false-name-proof is identified, i.e., the concavity of a surplus function over bidders.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=0347031344&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=0347031344&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00045-9
DO - 10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00045-9
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:0347031344
VL - 46
SP - 174
EP - 188
JO - Games and Economic Behavior
JF - Games and Economic Behavior
SN - 0899-8256
IS - 1
ER -