The evolution of altruism by costly punishment in lattice-structured populations: Score-dependent viability versus score-dependent fertility

Mayuko Nakamaru, Yoh Iwasa

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

74 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Question: What part might punishment play in maintaining cooperation in animal and human societies? Mathematical method: Evolutionary game theory. The game's score modifies either viability or fertility. Key assumptions: The population is spatially structured. After a player dies, a copy of one of its nearest neighbours fills the vacancy. Altruists may punish selfish individuals by forcing them to pay a 'fine', but the punisher itself must pay to impose the fine. Conclusions: Punishment can make altruism an evolutionarily stable strategy. In a well-mixed population, if the score affects fertility, then an altruist-punisher cannot invade a selfish population. But it can invade if the score affects viability and the fine is large. In a spatially structured population, an altruist-punisher can invade a selfish population whether the score affects viability or fertility. In the viability model, large fines promote altruism. But in the fertility model, either a large fine or a high benefit of cooperation promotes altruism.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)853-870
Number of pages18
JournalEvolutionary Ecology Research
Volume7
Issue number6
Publication statusPublished - Oct 2005

Fingerprint

Altruism
altruism
Punishment
Fertility
fertility
viability
Population
Game Theory
evolutionarily stable strategy
game theory
evolutionary theory
numerical method
fill
animal
animals

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Ecology
  • Ecology, Evolution, Behavior and Systematics
  • Genetics
  • Genetics(clinical)

Cite this

The evolution of altruism by costly punishment in lattice-structured populations : Score-dependent viability versus score-dependent fertility. / Nakamaru, Mayuko; Iwasa, Yoh.

In: Evolutionary Ecology Research, Vol. 7, No. 6, 10.2005, p. 853-870.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

@article{d8e4df9a8aff4d9bb998b0cd238ffe36,
title = "The evolution of altruism by costly punishment in lattice-structured populations: Score-dependent viability versus score-dependent fertility",
abstract = "Question: What part might punishment play in maintaining cooperation in animal and human societies? Mathematical method: Evolutionary game theory. The game's score modifies either viability or fertility. Key assumptions: The population is spatially structured. After a player dies, a copy of one of its nearest neighbours fills the vacancy. Altruists may punish selfish individuals by forcing them to pay a 'fine', but the punisher itself must pay to impose the fine. Conclusions: Punishment can make altruism an evolutionarily stable strategy. In a well-mixed population, if the score affects fertility, then an altruist-punisher cannot invade a selfish population. But it can invade if the score affects viability and the fine is large. In a spatially structured population, an altruist-punisher can invade a selfish population whether the score affects viability or fertility. In the viability model, large fines promote altruism. But in the fertility model, either a large fine or a high benefit of cooperation promotes altruism.",
author = "Mayuko Nakamaru and Yoh Iwasa",
year = "2005",
month = "10",
language = "English",
volume = "7",
pages = "853--870",
journal = "Evolutionary Ecology Research",
issn = "1522-0613",
publisher = "Evolutionary Ecology Research",
number = "6",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - The evolution of altruism by costly punishment in lattice-structured populations

T2 - Score-dependent viability versus score-dependent fertility

AU - Nakamaru, Mayuko

AU - Iwasa, Yoh

PY - 2005/10

Y1 - 2005/10

N2 - Question: What part might punishment play in maintaining cooperation in animal and human societies? Mathematical method: Evolutionary game theory. The game's score modifies either viability or fertility. Key assumptions: The population is spatially structured. After a player dies, a copy of one of its nearest neighbours fills the vacancy. Altruists may punish selfish individuals by forcing them to pay a 'fine', but the punisher itself must pay to impose the fine. Conclusions: Punishment can make altruism an evolutionarily stable strategy. In a well-mixed population, if the score affects fertility, then an altruist-punisher cannot invade a selfish population. But it can invade if the score affects viability and the fine is large. In a spatially structured population, an altruist-punisher can invade a selfish population whether the score affects viability or fertility. In the viability model, large fines promote altruism. But in the fertility model, either a large fine or a high benefit of cooperation promotes altruism.

AB - Question: What part might punishment play in maintaining cooperation in animal and human societies? Mathematical method: Evolutionary game theory. The game's score modifies either viability or fertility. Key assumptions: The population is spatially structured. After a player dies, a copy of one of its nearest neighbours fills the vacancy. Altruists may punish selfish individuals by forcing them to pay a 'fine', but the punisher itself must pay to impose the fine. Conclusions: Punishment can make altruism an evolutionarily stable strategy. In a well-mixed population, if the score affects fertility, then an altruist-punisher cannot invade a selfish population. But it can invade if the score affects viability and the fine is large. In a spatially structured population, an altruist-punisher can invade a selfish population whether the score affects viability or fertility. In the viability model, large fines promote altruism. But in the fertility model, either a large fine or a high benefit of cooperation promotes altruism.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=26444470523&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=26444470523&partnerID=8YFLogxK

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:26444470523

VL - 7

SP - 853

EP - 870

JO - Evolutionary Ecology Research

JF - Evolutionary Ecology Research

SN - 1522-0613

IS - 6

ER -