Abstract
This study provides a new framework for international environmental agreements (IEAs), which include punishment exceptions for accidental deviation, using repeated games. We consider that deviation from an agreement can occur accidentally because of phenomena such as natural disasters, even if the agreement is sustained as a weakly renegotiation-proof equilibrium. If an IEA signatory deviates accidentally, it fails to achieve its emission abatement target. In the repeated game, a cooperative relationship among signatories is sustained by a strategy that prescribes rules of cooperation and punishment for deviation. We present a new strategy, called Regional Cooperative, which integrates accidental deviations into an IEA. Our model reveals that punishing countries tend to revoke the punishment of deviators and return to cooperation if an accidental deviator increases its abatement volume. That is, the abatement efforts of the accidental deviator can lead to renegotiation. The Regional Cooperative strategy motivates the accidental deviator to try to engage in abatement and the punishing countries to restart cooperation by renegotiation. We conclude that social welfare loss by punishment is prevented through renegotiation in cases of accidental deviation.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 345-361 |
| Number of pages | 17 |
| Journal | Environmental Modeling and Assessment |
| Volume | 22 |
| Issue number | 4 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - Aug 1 2017 |
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All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Environmental Science(all)
Cite this
The Impact of Accidental Deviation by Natural Disaster-Prone Countries on Renegotiation-Proof Climate Change Agreements. / Takashima, Nobuyuki.
In: Environmental Modeling and Assessment, Vol. 22, No. 4, 01.08.2017, p. 345-361.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - The Impact of Accidental Deviation by Natural Disaster-Prone Countries on Renegotiation-Proof Climate Change Agreements
AU - Takashima, Nobuyuki
PY - 2017/8/1
Y1 - 2017/8/1
N2 - This study provides a new framework for international environmental agreements (IEAs), which include punishment exceptions for accidental deviation, using repeated games. We consider that deviation from an agreement can occur accidentally because of phenomena such as natural disasters, even if the agreement is sustained as a weakly renegotiation-proof equilibrium. If an IEA signatory deviates accidentally, it fails to achieve its emission abatement target. In the repeated game, a cooperative relationship among signatories is sustained by a strategy that prescribes rules of cooperation and punishment for deviation. We present a new strategy, called Regional Cooperative, which integrates accidental deviations into an IEA. Our model reveals that punishing countries tend to revoke the punishment of deviators and return to cooperation if an accidental deviator increases its abatement volume. That is, the abatement efforts of the accidental deviator can lead to renegotiation. The Regional Cooperative strategy motivates the accidental deviator to try to engage in abatement and the punishing countries to restart cooperation by renegotiation. We conclude that social welfare loss by punishment is prevented through renegotiation in cases of accidental deviation.
AB - This study provides a new framework for international environmental agreements (IEAs), which include punishment exceptions for accidental deviation, using repeated games. We consider that deviation from an agreement can occur accidentally because of phenomena such as natural disasters, even if the agreement is sustained as a weakly renegotiation-proof equilibrium. If an IEA signatory deviates accidentally, it fails to achieve its emission abatement target. In the repeated game, a cooperative relationship among signatories is sustained by a strategy that prescribes rules of cooperation and punishment for deviation. We present a new strategy, called Regional Cooperative, which integrates accidental deviations into an IEA. Our model reveals that punishing countries tend to revoke the punishment of deviators and return to cooperation if an accidental deviator increases its abatement volume. That is, the abatement efforts of the accidental deviator can lead to renegotiation. The Regional Cooperative strategy motivates the accidental deviator to try to engage in abatement and the punishing countries to restart cooperation by renegotiation. We conclude that social welfare loss by punishment is prevented through renegotiation in cases of accidental deviation.
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U2 - 10.1007/s10666-016-9542-2
DO - 10.1007/s10666-016-9542-2
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85001850175
VL - 22
SP - 345
EP - 361
JO - Environmental Modeling and Assessment
JF - Environmental Modeling and Assessment
SN - 1420-2026
IS - 4
ER -