Transfers in international environmental agreements under heterogeneity

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Abstract

This paper analytically compares the effectiveness of internal and external transfers in encouraging participants in international environmental agreements (IEAs). We divide countries into two homogeneous groups: developed and developing countries. Further, we assume that strong asymmetries exist in their abatement benefits and costs. Using the non-cooperative game model of coalition formation, our result shows that both types of transfers can enlarge the size of self-enforcing coalitions, and the external transfers are always preferred.

Original languageEnglish
JournalApplied Economics
DOIs
Publication statusAccepted/In press - 2021

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Economics and Econometrics

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