Two case studies for trading multiple indivisible goods with indifferences

Akihisa Sonoda, Etsushi Fujita, Taiki Todo, Makoto Yokoo

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

7 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Individual rationality, Pareto efficiency, and strategy-proofness are crucial properties of decision making functions, or mechanisms, in social choice literatures. In this paper we investigate mechanisms for exchange models where each agent is initially endowed with a set of goods and may have indifferences on distinct bundles of goods, and monetary transfers are not allowed. Sönmez (1999) showed that in such models, those three properties are not compatible in general. The impossibility, however, only holds under an assumption on preference domains. The main purpose of this paper is to discuss the compatibility of those three properties when the assumption does not hold. We first establish a preference domain called top-only preferences, which violates the assumption, and develop a class of exchange mechanisms that satisfy all those properties. Each mechanism in the class utilizes one instance of the mechanisms introduced by Saban and Sethuraman (2013). We also find a class of preference domains called m-chotomous preferences, where the assumption fails and these properties are incompatible.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings of the 28th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence and the 26th Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence Conference and the 5th Symposium on Educational Advances in Artificial Intelligence
PublisherAI Access Foundation
Pages791-797
Number of pages7
ISBN (Electronic)9781577356776
Publication statusPublished - Jan 1 2014
Event28th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2014, 26th Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence Conference, IAAI 2014 and the 5th Symposium on Educational Advances in Artificial Intelligence, EAAI 2014 - Quebec City, Canada
Duration: Jul 27 2014Jul 31 2014

Publication series

NameProceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Volume1

Other

Other28th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2014, 26th Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence Conference, IAAI 2014 and the 5th Symposium on Educational Advances in Artificial Intelligence, EAAI 2014
CountryCanada
CityQuebec City
Period7/27/147/31/14

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Software
  • Artificial Intelligence

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  • Cite this

    Sonoda, A., Fujita, E., Todo, T., & Yokoo, M. (2014). Two case studies for trading multiple indivisible goods with indifferences. In Proceedings of the 28th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence and the 26th Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence Conference and the 5th Symposium on Educational Advances in Artificial Intelligence (pp. 791-797). (Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence; Vol. 1). AI Access Foundation.