Two-Sided Matching over Social Networks

Sung Ho Cho, Taiki Todo, Makoto Yokoo

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

A new paradigm of mechanism design, called mechanism design over social networks, investigates agents' incentives to diffuse the information of mechanisms to their followers over social networks. In this paper we consider it for two-sided matching, where the agents on one side, say students, are distributed over social networks and thus are not fully observable to the mechanism designer, while the agents on the other side, say colleges, are known a priori. The main purpose of this paper is to clarify the existence of mechanisms that satisfy several properties that are classified into four criteria: incentive constraints, efficiency constraints, stability constraints, and fairness constraints. We proposed three mechanisms and showed that no mechanism is better than these mechanisms, i.e., they are in the Pareto frontier according to the set of properties defined in this paper.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings of the 31st International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 2022
EditorsLuc De Raedt, Luc De Raedt
PublisherInternational Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence
Pages186-193
Number of pages8
ISBN (Electronic)9781956792003
Publication statusPublished - 2022
Event31st International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 2022 - Vienna, Austria
Duration: Jul 23 2022Jul 29 2022

Publication series

NameIJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
ISSN (Print)1045-0823

Conference

Conference31st International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 2022
Country/TerritoryAustria
CityVienna
Period7/23/227/29/22

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Artificial Intelligence

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