Two-stage n-person prisoner's dilemma with social preferences

Seiji Takanashi, Makoto Yokoo

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

We examine two-stage games where all players choose the parameters of social preferences at the first stage and play the n-person prisoner's dilemma at the second stage with perfect and imperfect information. This model expresses situations where players can choose how much they depend on the other players' payoffs. In this model, we get the following results. If the game has perfect information, cooperation among all players can be attained in an equilibrium by punishing a deviating player. If each player plays the n-person prisoner's dilemma without knowing the choices of the other players at the first stage, cooperation among a constant number of players can be attained in an equilibrium. In addition, we study two-stage games where all players choose how much they are concerned with the social welfare at the first stage and play the n-person prisoner's dilemma at the second stage. We show that when the players are more concerned with the minimum payoff, the number of players who cooperate at the second stage in an equilibrium weakly decreases.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publication18th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2019
PublisherInternational Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS)
Pages2206-2208
Number of pages3
ISBN (Electronic)9781510892002
Publication statusPublished - Jan 1 2019
Event18th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2019 - Montreal, Canada
Duration: May 13 2019May 17 2019

Publication series

NameProceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS
Volume4
ISSN (Print)1548-8403
ISSN (Electronic)1558-2914

Conference

Conference18th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2019
CountryCanada
CityMontreal
Period5/13/195/17/19

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Artificial Intelligence
  • Software
  • Control and Systems Engineering

Cite this

Takanashi, S., & Yokoo, M. (2019). Two-stage n-person prisoner's dilemma with social preferences. In 18th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2019 (pp. 2206-2208). (Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS; Vol. 4). International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS).