We analyzed the mechanism of the occurrence of timber theft in southern Miyazaki Prefecture by verifying the three essential elements of a routine activity approach, 'a likely offender', 'a suitable target' and 'the absence of a capable guardian', as one of the theories of environmental criminology. As a result, it was suggested that high transaction costs for negotiations with forest owners due to inadequacy of small-scale forest ownership structure and inheritance registration motivated forgery of logging notifications by timberland brokers. It was also confirmed that the timber had become a suitable target due to increased price and demand. In addition, monitoring conditions were also missing due to the lack of forest owners' awareness, monitoring by the owners and a supervisory function of the forest administration logging notification system. In addition, the division of labor between brokers and the logging company obscured the responsibility to the detriment of forest owners and the logging company did not check the boundaries and ownership of the location before felling. From this study, strengthening the monitoring of the forest owner and the government, and reducing the transaction costs of stumpage trade bargaining by thorough registration of succession were considered to be effective against timber theft crime.
|Number of pages||7|
|Journal||Nihon Ringakkai Shi/Journal of the Japanese Forestry Society|
|Publication status||Published - 2019|
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