Weighted matching markets with budget constraints

Naoto Hamada, Anisse Ismaili, Takamasa Suzuki, Makoto Yokoo

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

6 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We investigate markets with a set of students on one side and a set of colleges on the other. A student and college can be linked by a weighted contract that defines the student's wage, while a college's budget for hiring students is limited. Stability is a crucial requirement for matching mechanisms to be applied in the real world. A standard stability requirement is coalitional stability, i.e., no pair of a college and group of students has incentive to deviate. We find that a coalitionally stable matching is not guaranteed to exist, verifying the coalitional stability for a given matching is coXP- complete, and the problem to find whether a coalitionally stable matching exists in a given market, is NPNP-complete (that is Ef-complete). Given these computational hardness results, we pursue a weaker stability requirement called pairwise stability, i.e., no pair of a college and single student has incentive to deviate. We then design a strategy-proof mechanism that works in polynomial-Time for computing a pairwise stable matching in typed markets in which students are partitioned into types that induce their possible wages.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publication16th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2017
EditorsEdmund Durfee, Sanmay Das, Kate Larson, Michael Winikoff
PublisherInternational Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS)
Pages317-325
Number of pages9
ISBN (Electronic)9781510855076
Publication statusPublished - Jan 1 2017
Event16th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2017 - Sao Paulo, Brazil
Duration: May 8 2017May 12 2017

Publication series

NameProceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS
Volume1
ISSN (Print)1548-8403
ISSN (Electronic)1558-2914

Other

Other16th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2017
CountryBrazil
CitySao Paulo
Period5/8/175/12/17

Fingerprint

Students
Wages
Hardness
Polynomials

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Artificial Intelligence
  • Software
  • Control and Systems Engineering

Cite this

Hamada, N., Ismaili, A., Suzuki, T., & Yokoo, M. (2017). Weighted matching markets with budget constraints. In E. Durfee, S. Das, K. Larson, & M. Winikoff (Eds.), 16th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2017 (pp. 317-325). (Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS; Vol. 1). International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS).

Weighted matching markets with budget constraints. / Hamada, Naoto; Ismaili, Anisse; Suzuki, Takamasa; Yokoo, Makoto.

16th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2017. ed. / Edmund Durfee; Sanmay Das; Kate Larson; Michael Winikoff. International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS), 2017. p. 317-325 (Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS; Vol. 1).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Hamada, N, Ismaili, A, Suzuki, T & Yokoo, M 2017, Weighted matching markets with budget constraints. in E Durfee, S Das, K Larson & M Winikoff (eds), 16th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2017. Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS, vol. 1, International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS), pp. 317-325, 16th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2017, Sao Paulo, Brazil, 5/8/17.
Hamada N, Ismaili A, Suzuki T, Yokoo M. Weighted matching markets with budget constraints. In Durfee E, Das S, Larson K, Winikoff M, editors, 16th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2017. International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS). 2017. p. 317-325. (Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS).
Hamada, Naoto ; Ismaili, Anisse ; Suzuki, Takamasa ; Yokoo, Makoto. / Weighted matching markets with budget constraints. 16th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2017. editor / Edmund Durfee ; Sanmay Das ; Kate Larson ; Michael Winikoff. International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS), 2017. pp. 317-325 (Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS).
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