Which is more effective for suppressing an infectious disease: Imperfect vaccination or defense against contagion?

Kazuki Kuga, Jun Tanimoto

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

22 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We consider two imperfect ways to protect against an infectious disease such as influenza, namely vaccination giving only partial immunity and a defense against contagion such as wearing a mask. We build up a new analytic framework considering those two cases instead of perfect vaccination, conventionally assumed as a premise, with the assumption of an infinite and well-mixed population. Our framework also considers three different strategy-updating rules based on evolutionary game theory: conventional pairwise comparison with one randomly selected agent, another concept of pairwise comparison referring to a social average, and direct alternative selection not depending on the usual copying concept. We successfully obtain a phase diagram in which vaccination coverage at equilibrium can be compared when assuming the model of either imperfect vaccination or a defense against contagion. The obtained phase diagram reveals that a defense against contagion is marginally inferior to an imperfect vaccination as long as the same coefficient value is used. Highlights - We build a new analytical framework for a vaccination game combined with the susceptible-infected-recovered (SIR) model. - Our model can evaluate imperfect provisions such as vaccination giving only partial immunity and a defense against contagion. - We obtain a phase diagram with which to compare the quantitative effects of partial vaccination and a defense against contagion.

Original languageEnglish
Article number023407
JournalJournal of Statistical Mechanics: Theory and Experiment
Volume2018
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Feb 23 2018

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Contagion
Vaccination
Infectious Diseases
infectious diseases
Imperfect
phase diagrams
immunity
Phase Diagram
Pairwise Comparisons
game theory
Immunity
influenza
Partial
games
Evolutionary Game Theory
masks
Infectious diseases
Influenza
Mask
Updating

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Statistical and Nonlinear Physics
  • Statistics and Probability
  • Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty

Cite this

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abstract = "We consider two imperfect ways to protect against an infectious disease such as influenza, namely vaccination giving only partial immunity and a defense against contagion such as wearing a mask. We build up a new analytic framework considering those two cases instead of perfect vaccination, conventionally assumed as a premise, with the assumption of an infinite and well-mixed population. Our framework also considers three different strategy-updating rules based on evolutionary game theory: conventional pairwise comparison with one randomly selected agent, another concept of pairwise comparison referring to a social average, and direct alternative selection not depending on the usual copying concept. We successfully obtain a phase diagram in which vaccination coverage at equilibrium can be compared when assuming the model of either imperfect vaccination or a defense against contagion. The obtained phase diagram reveals that a defense against contagion is marginally inferior to an imperfect vaccination as long as the same coefficient value is used. Highlights - We build a new analytical framework for a vaccination game combined with the susceptible-infected-recovered (SIR) model. - Our model can evaluate imperfect provisions such as vaccination giving only partial immunity and a defense against contagion. - We obtain a phase diagram with which to compare the quantitative effects of partial vaccination and a defense against contagion.",
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