TY - GEN
T1 - Yet another note on block withholding attack on bitcoin mining pools
AU - Bag, Samiran
AU - Sakurai, Kouichi
N1 - Funding Information:
The second author was partially supported by JSPS Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research named: “KAKEN-15H02711”.
Funding Information:
The authors were partially supported by the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (Japan) and the Department of Science and Technology (India) under the Japan-India Science Cooperative Program of research project named: “Computational Aspects of Mathematical Design and Analysis of Secure Communication Systems Based on Cryptographic Primitives”.
Publisher Copyright:
© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016.
PY - 2016
Y1 - 2016
N2 - In this paper we provide a short quantitative analysis of Bit- coin Block Withholding (BWH) Attack. In this study, we investigate the incentive earned by a miner who either independently or at the diktat of a separate mining pool launches Block Withholding attack on a target mining pool. The victim pool shares its earned revenue with the rogue attacker. We investigate the property revenue function of the attacker and find parameters that could maximize the gain of the attacker. We then propose a new concept that we call “special reward”. This spe- cial rewarding scheme is aimed at discouraging the attackers by grant- ing additional incentive to a miner who actually finds a block. A BWH attacker who never submits a valid block to the pool will be deprived from this special reward and her gain will be less than her expectation. Depending upon the actual monetary value of the special reward a pool can significantly reduce the revenue of a BWH attacker and thus can even ward off the threat of an attack.
AB - In this paper we provide a short quantitative analysis of Bit- coin Block Withholding (BWH) Attack. In this study, we investigate the incentive earned by a miner who either independently or at the diktat of a separate mining pool launches Block Withholding attack on a target mining pool. The victim pool shares its earned revenue with the rogue attacker. We investigate the property revenue function of the attacker and find parameters that could maximize the gain of the attacker. We then propose a new concept that we call “special reward”. This spe- cial rewarding scheme is aimed at discouraging the attackers by grant- ing additional incentive to a miner who actually finds a block. A BWH attacker who never submits a valid block to the pool will be deprived from this special reward and her gain will be less than her expectation. Depending upon the actual monetary value of the special reward a pool can significantly reduce the revenue of a BWH attacker and thus can even ward off the threat of an attack.
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U2 - 10.1007/978-3-319-45871-7_11
DO - 10.1007/978-3-319-45871-7_11
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:84988422509
SN - 9783319458700
T3 - Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
SP - 167
EP - 180
BT - Information Security - 19th International Conference, ISC 2016, Proceedings
A2 - Bishop, Matt
A2 - Nascimento, Anderson C.A.
PB - Springer Verlag
T2 - 19th Annual International Conference on Information Security, ISC 2016
Y2 - 3 September 2016 through 6 September 2016
ER -