Zero-knowledge protocols for the McEliece encryption

Kirill Morozov; Tsuyoshi Takagi

doi:10.1007/978-3-642-31448-3_14

Zero-knowledge protocols for the McEliece encryption

Kirill Morozov, Tsuyoshi Takagi

Laboratory of Mathematical Design for Advanced Cryptography

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

7 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We present two zero-knowledge protocols for the code-based McEliece public key encryption scheme in the standard model. Consider a prover who encrypted a plaintext m into a ciphertext c under the public key pk. The first protocol is a proof of plaintext knowledge (PPK), where the prover convinces a polynomially bounded verifier on a joint input (c,pk) that he knows m without actually revealing it. This construction uses code-based Véron's zero-knowledge identification scheme. The second protocol, which builds on the first one, is a verifiable McEliece encryption, were the prover convinces a polynomially bounded verifier on a joint input (c,pk,m) that c is a valid encryption of m, without performing decryption. These protocols are the first PPK and the first verifiable encryption for code-based cryptosystems.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	Information Security and Privacy - 17th Australasian Conference, ACISP 2012, Proceedings
Pages	180-193
Number of pages	14
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-31448-3_14
Publication status	Published - 2012
Event	17th Australasian Conference on Information Security and Privacy, ACISP 2012 - Wollongong, NSW, Australia Duration: Jul 9 2012 → Jul 11 2012

Publication series

Name	Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume	7372 LNCS
ISSN (Print)	0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)	1611-3349

Other

Other	17th Australasian Conference on Information Security and Privacy, ACISP 2012
Country/Territory	Australia
City	Wollongong, NSW
Period	7/9/12 → 7/11/12

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

Theoretical Computer Science
Computer Science(all)

Access to Document

10.1007/978-3-642-31448-3_14

Cite this

Morozov, K., & Takagi, T. (2012). Zero-knowledge protocols for the McEliece encryption. In Information Security and Privacy - 17th Australasian Conference, ACISP 2012, Proceedings (pp. 180-193). (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 7372 LNCS). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-31448-3_14

Zero-knowledge protocols for the McEliece encryption. / Morozov, Kirill; Takagi, Tsuyoshi.

Information Security and Privacy - 17th Australasian Conference, ACISP 2012, Proceedings. 2012. p. 180-193 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 7372 LNCS).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

Morozov, K & Takagi, T 2012, Zero-knowledge protocols for the McEliece encryption. in Information Security and Privacy - 17th Australasian Conference, ACISP 2012, Proceedings. Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), vol. 7372 LNCS, pp. 180-193, 17th Australasian Conference on Information Security and Privacy, ACISP 2012, Wollongong, NSW, Australia, 7/9/12. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-31448-3_14

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Zero-knowledge protocols for the McEliece encryption

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