Zero-knowledge protocols for the McEliece encryption

Kirill Morozov, Tsuyoshi Takagi

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

6 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We present two zero-knowledge protocols for the code-based McEliece public key encryption scheme in the standard model. Consider a prover who encrypted a plaintext m into a ciphertext c under the public key pk. The first protocol is a proof of plaintext knowledge (PPK), where the prover convinces a polynomially bounded verifier on a joint input (c,pk) that he knows m without actually revealing it. This construction uses code-based Véron's zero-knowledge identification scheme. The second protocol, which builds on the first one, is a verifiable McEliece encryption, were the prover convinces a polynomially bounded verifier on a joint input (c,pk,m) that c is a valid encryption of m, without performing decryption. These protocols are the first PPK and the first verifiable encryption for code-based cryptosystems.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationInformation Security and Privacy - 17th Australasian Conference, ACISP 2012, Proceedings
Pages180-193
Number of pages14
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2012
Event17th Australasian Conference on Information Security and Privacy, ACISP 2012 - Wollongong, NSW, Australia
Duration: Jul 9 2012Jul 11 2012

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume7372 LNCS
ISSN (Print)0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)1611-3349

Other

Other17th Australasian Conference on Information Security and Privacy, ACISP 2012
CountryAustralia
CityWollongong, NSW
Period7/9/127/11/12

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Theoretical Computer Science
  • Computer Science(all)

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