A complexity approach for core-selecting exchange with multiple indivisible goods under lexicographic preferences

Etsushi Fujita, Julien Lesca, Akihisa Sonoda, Taiki Todo, Makoto Yokoo

研究成果: 著書/レポートタイプへの貢献会議での発言

16 引用 (Scopus)

抄録

Core-selection is a crucial property of social choice functions, or rules, in social choice literature. It is also desirable to address the incentive of agents to cheat by misreporting their preferences. This paper investigates an exchange problem where each agent may have multiple indivisible goods, agents' preferences over sets of goods are assumed to be lexicographic, and side payments are not allowed. We propose an exchange rule called augmented top-trading-cycles (ATTC) procedure based on the original TTC procedure. We first show that the ATTC procedure is core-selecting. We then show that finding a beneficial misreport under the ATTC procedure is NP-hard. Under the ATTC procedure, we finally clarify the relationship between preference misreport and splitting, which is a different type of manipulation.

元の言語英語
ホスト出版物のタイトルProceedings of the 29th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2015 and the 27th Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence Conference, IAAI 2015
出版者AI Access Foundation
ページ907-913
ページ数7
2
ISBN(電子版)9781577357001
出版物ステータス出版済み - 6 1 2015
イベント29th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2015 and the 27th Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence Conference, IAAI 2015 - Austin, 米国
継続期間: 1 25 20151 30 2015

その他

その他29th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2015 and the 27th Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence Conference, IAAI 2015
米国
Austin
期間1/25/151/30/15

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Software
  • Artificial Intelligence

これを引用

Fujita, E., Lesca, J., Sonoda, A., Todo, T., & Yokoo, M. (2015). A complexity approach for core-selecting exchange with multiple indivisible goods under lexicographic preferences. : Proceedings of the 29th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2015 and the 27th Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence Conference, IAAI 2015 (巻 2, pp. 907-913). AI Access Foundation.

A complexity approach for core-selecting exchange with multiple indivisible goods under lexicographic preferences. / Fujita, Etsushi; Lesca, Julien; Sonoda, Akihisa; Todo, Taiki; Yokoo, Makoto.

Proceedings of the 29th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2015 and the 27th Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence Conference, IAAI 2015. 巻 2 AI Access Foundation, 2015. p. 907-913.

研究成果: 著書/レポートタイプへの貢献会議での発言

Fujita, E, Lesca, J, Sonoda, A, Todo, T & Yokoo, M 2015, A complexity approach for core-selecting exchange with multiple indivisible goods under lexicographic preferences. : Proceedings of the 29th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2015 and the 27th Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence Conference, IAAI 2015. 巻. 2, AI Access Foundation, pp. 907-913, 29th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2015 and the 27th Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence Conference, IAAI 2015, Austin, 米国, 1/25/15.
Fujita E, Lesca J, Sonoda A, Todo T, Yokoo M. A complexity approach for core-selecting exchange with multiple indivisible goods under lexicographic preferences. : Proceedings of the 29th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2015 and the 27th Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence Conference, IAAI 2015. 巻 2. AI Access Foundation. 2015. p. 907-913
Fujita, Etsushi ; Lesca, Julien ; Sonoda, Akihisa ; Todo, Taiki ; Yokoo, Makoto. / A complexity approach for core-selecting exchange with multiple indivisible goods under lexicographic preferences. Proceedings of the 29th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2015 and the 27th Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence Conference, IAAI 2015. 巻 2 AI Access Foundation, 2015. pp. 907-913
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