A new strategy-proof greedy-allocation combinatorial auction protocol and its extension to open ascending auction protocol

Takayuki Ito, Makoto Yokoo, Atsushi Iwasaki, Shigeo Matsubara

研究成果: 会議への寄与タイプ論文

3 引用 (Scopus)

抄録

This paper proposes a new combinatorial auction protocol called Average-Max-Minimal-Bundle (AM-MB) protocol. The characteristics of the AM-MB protocol are as follows: (i) it is strategyproof. i.e., truth-telling is a dominant strategy, (ii) the computational overhead is very low, since it allocates bundles greedily thereby avoiding an explicit combinatorial optimization problem, and (iii) it can obtain higher social surplus and revenue than can the Max-Minimal-Bundle (M-MB) protocol, which also satisfies (i) and (ii). Furthermore, this paper extends the AM-MB protocol to an open ascending-price protocol in which straightforward bidding is an ex-post Nash equilibrium.

元の言語英語
ページ261-266
ページ数6
出版物ステータス出版済み - 12 1 2005
イベント20th National Conference on Artificial Intelligence and the 17th Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence Conference, AAAI-05/IAAI-05 - Pittsburgh, PA, 米国
継続期間: 7 9 20057 13 2005

その他

その他20th National Conference on Artificial Intelligence and the 17th Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence Conference, AAAI-05/IAAI-05
米国
Pittsburgh, PA
期間7/9/057/13/05

Fingerprint

Combinatorial optimization

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Software
  • Artificial Intelligence

これを引用

Ito, T., Yokoo, M., Iwasaki, A., & Matsubara, S. (2005). A new strategy-proof greedy-allocation combinatorial auction protocol and its extension to open ascending auction protocol. 261-266. 論文発表場所 20th National Conference on Artificial Intelligence and the 17th Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence Conference, AAAI-05/IAAI-05, Pittsburgh, PA, 米国.

A new strategy-proof greedy-allocation combinatorial auction protocol and its extension to open ascending auction protocol. / Ito, Takayuki; Yokoo, Makoto; Iwasaki, Atsushi; Matsubara, Shigeo.

2005. 261-266 論文発表場所 20th National Conference on Artificial Intelligence and the 17th Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence Conference, AAAI-05/IAAI-05, Pittsburgh, PA, 米国.

研究成果: 会議への寄与タイプ論文

Ito, T, Yokoo, M, Iwasaki, A & Matsubara, S 2005, 'A new strategy-proof greedy-allocation combinatorial auction protocol and its extension to open ascending auction protocol', 論文発表場所 20th National Conference on Artificial Intelligence and the 17th Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence Conference, AAAI-05/IAAI-05, Pittsburgh, PA, 米国, 7/9/05 - 7/13/05 pp. 261-266.
Ito T, Yokoo M, Iwasaki A, Matsubara S. A new strategy-proof greedy-allocation combinatorial auction protocol and its extension to open ascending auction protocol. 2005. 論文発表場所 20th National Conference on Artificial Intelligence and the 17th Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence Conference, AAAI-05/IAAI-05, Pittsburgh, PA, 米国.
Ito, Takayuki ; Yokoo, Makoto ; Iwasaki, Atsushi ; Matsubara, Shigeo. / A new strategy-proof greedy-allocation combinatorial auction protocol and its extension to open ascending auction protocol. 論文発表場所 20th National Conference on Artificial Intelligence and the 17th Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence Conference, AAAI-05/IAAI-05, Pittsburgh, PA, 米国.6 p.
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