A note on the serial dictatorship with project closures

研究成果: ジャーナルへの寄稿記事

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In this paper, we consider the problem of assigning agents having preferences to projects with capacities and lower quotas. For this problem, Monte and Tumennasan proposed a strategy-proof and Pareto efficient mechanism, called the serial dictatorship with project closures. In this paper, we show that the serial dictatorship with project closures can be extended to a more general setting.

元の言語英語
ページ(範囲)559-561
ページ数3
ジャーナルOperations Research Letters
41
発行部数5
DOI
出版物ステータス出版済み - 8 26 2013

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All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Software
  • Management Science and Operations Research
  • Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering
  • Applied Mathematics

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