TY - JOUR
T1 - A note on the serial dictatorship with project closures
AU - Kamiyama, Naoyuki
N1 - Copyright:
Copyright 2013 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.
PY - 2013
Y1 - 2013
N2 - In this paper, we consider the problem of assigning agents having preferences to projects with capacities and lower quotas. For this problem, Monte and Tumennasan proposed a strategy-proof and Pareto efficient mechanism, called the serial dictatorship with project closures. In this paper, we show that the serial dictatorship with project closures can be extended to a more general setting.
AB - In this paper, we consider the problem of assigning agents having preferences to projects with capacities and lower quotas. For this problem, Monte and Tumennasan proposed a strategy-proof and Pareto efficient mechanism, called the serial dictatorship with project closures. In this paper, we show that the serial dictatorship with project closures can be extended to a more general setting.
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U2 - 10.1016/j.orl.2013.07.006
DO - 10.1016/j.orl.2013.07.006
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:84882389675
VL - 41
SP - 559
EP - 561
JO - Operations Research Letters
JF - Operations Research Letters
SN - 0167-6377
IS - 5
ER -