A study of a quadruple co-evolutionary model and its reciprocity phase for various Prisoner's Dilemma game

研究成果: Contribution to journalArticle査読

9 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

We present and numerically investigate a quadruple co-evolutionary model for 2 × 2 Prisoner's Dilemma games which allows not only for agents to adopt strategy (Cooperation C or Defection D) and for network topology, but also for the probability of link rewiring that controls the speed of network evolution and the updating rule itself. The results of a series of simulations reveal that C agents in a coexisting phase increase their rewiring probability to avoid neighboring D agents' exploitation through the Game Exit Option. This evolutionary process leads most agents to adopt pairwise updating even though Imitation Max update adopted by all agents brings a higher payoff.

本文言語英語
ページ(範囲)401-417
ページ数17
ジャーナルInternational Journal of Modern Physics C
22
4
DOI
出版ステータス出版済み - 4 2011

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • 統計物理学および非線形物理学
  • 数理物理学
  • 物理学および天文学(全般)
  • コンピュータ サイエンスの応用
  • 計算理論と計算数学

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