Achieving sustainable cooperation in generalized Prisoner's dilemma with observation errors

Fuuki Shigenaka, Tadashi Sekiguchi, Atsushi Iwasaki, Makoto Yokoo

研究成果: Contribution to conferencePaper査読

1 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

A repeated game is a formal model for analyzing cooperation in long-term relationships, e.g., in the prisoner's dilemma. Although the case where each player observes her opponent's action with some observation errors (imperfect private monitoring) is difficult to analyze, a special type of an equilibrium called belief-free equilibrium is identified to make the analysis in private monitoring tractable. However, existing works using a belief-free equilibrium show that cooperative relations can be sustainable only in ideal situations. We deal with a generic problem that can model both the prisoner's dilemma and the team production problem. We examine a situation with an additional action that is dominated by another action. To our surprise, by adding this seemingly irrelevant action, players can achieve sustainable cooperative relations far beyond the ideal situations. More specifically, we identify a class of strategies called one-shot punishment strategy that can constitute a belief-free equilibrium in a wide range of parameters. Moreover, for a two-player case, the obtained welfare matches a theoretical upper bound.

本文言語英語
ページ677-683
ページ数7
出版ステータス出版済み - 2017
イベント31st AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2017 - San Francisco, 米国
継続期間: 2 4 20172 10 2017

その他

その他31st AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2017
国/地域米国
CitySan Francisco
Period2/4/172/10/17

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • 人工知能

フィンガープリント

「Achieving sustainable cooperation in generalized Prisoner's dilemma with observation errors」の研究トピックを掘り下げます。これらがまとまってユニークなフィンガープリントを構成します。

引用スタイル