Characterization of strategy-proof, revenue monotone combinatorial auction mechanisms and connection with false-name-proofness

Taiki Todo, Atsushi Iwasaki, Makoto Yokoo

研究成果: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

3 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

A combinatorial auction mechanism consists of an allocation rule and a payment rule. There have been several studies on characterizing strategy-proof allocation rules. In particular, conditions called weak-monotonicity has been identified as a full characterization of them. On the other hand, revenue monotonicity is recognized as one of the desirable properties. A combinatorial auction mechanism is revenue monotone if a seller's revenue is guaranteed to weakly increase as the number of bidders grows. Though the property is quite reasonable, there exists virtually no work on the characterization. In this paper, we identified a simple condition called summation-monotonicity. We then proved that we can construct a strategy-proof, revenue monotone mechanism if and only if the allocation rule satisfies weak-monotonicity and summation-monotonicity. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt to characterize revenue monotone allocation rules. In addition, we shed light on a connection between revenue monotonicity and false-name-proofness. In fact, we proved that, assuming a natural condition, revenue monotonicity is equivalent to false-name-proofness for single-item auctions.

本文言語英語
ホスト出版物のタイトルInternet and Network Economics - 5th International Workshop, WINE 2009, Proceedings
ページ561-568
ページ数8
DOI
出版ステータス出版済み - 12 1 2009
イベント5th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics, WINE 2009 - Rome, イタリア
継続期間: 12 14 200912 18 2009

出版物シリーズ

名前Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
5929 LNCS
ISSN(印刷版)0302-9743
ISSN(電子版)1611-3349

その他

その他5th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics, WINE 2009
国/地域イタリア
CityRome
Period12/14/0912/18/09

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • 理論的コンピュータサイエンス
  • コンピュータ サイエンス(全般)

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