Characterizing false-name-proof allocation rules in combinatorial auctions

研究成果: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

23 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

A combinatorial auction mechanism consists of an allocation rule that defines the allocation of goods for each agent, and a payment rule that defines the payment of each winner. There have been several studies on characterizing strategy- proof allocation rules. In particular, a condition called weak- monotonicity has been identified as a full characterization of strategy-proof allocation rules. More specifically, for an allocation rule, there exists an appropriate payment rule so that the mechanism becomes strategy-proof if and only if it satisfies weak-monotonicity. In this paper, we identify a condition called sub-additivity which characterizes false-name-proof allocation rules. False- name-proofness generalizes strategy-proofness, by assuming that a bidder can submit multiple bids under fictitious identifiers. As far as the authors are aware, this is the first attempt to characterize false-name-proof allocation rules. We can utilize this characterization for developing a new false-name-proof mechanism, since we can concentrate on designing an allocation rule. As long as the allocation rule satisfies weak-monotonicity and sub-additivity, there always exists an appropriate payment rule. Furthermore, by utilizing the sub-additivity condition, we can easily verify whether a mechanism is false-name-proof. To our surprise, we found that two mechanisms, which were believed to be false-name- proof, do not satisfy sub-additivity; they are not false-name- proof. As demonstrated in these examples, our characterization is quite useful for mechanism verification.

本文言語英語
ホスト出版物のタイトル8th International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems 2009, AAMAS 2009
出版社International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS)
ページ958-965
ページ数8
2
ISBN(印刷版)9781615673346
出版ステータス出版済み - 2009
イベント8th International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems 2009, AAMAS 2009 - Budapest, ハンガリー
継続期間: 5 10 20095 15 2009

その他

その他8th International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems 2009, AAMAS 2009
国/地域ハンガリー
CityBudapest
Period5/10/095/15/09

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • 人工知能
  • ソフトウェア
  • 制御およびシステム工学

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