Coevolution of discrete, mixed, and continuous strategy systems boosts in the spatial prisoner's dilemma and chicken games

研究成果: ジャーナルへの寄稿学術誌査読

12 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

A coevolutionary model by which both the strategy system and strategy value itself are allowed to adapt is established in the framework of spatial 2 × 2 games. Agents decide to update their behaviors in accordance with a discrete strategy (with a binary strategy set comprising only either cooperation (C) or defection (D)), mixed strategy, or continuous strategy. Because of the evolutionary advantage of the mixed strategy, which allows relatively high cooperators to offer defection to their defective neighbors to avoid exploitation by them, we found that the mixed strategy diffuses to the entire society in most of the dilemma region, and uses robust cooperation to increase the agents’ typical payoffs.

本文言語英語
ページ(範囲)20-27
ページ数8
ジャーナルApplied Mathematics and Computation
304
DOI
出版ステータス出版済み - 7月 1 2017

!!!All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • 計算数学
  • 応用数学

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