Coexistence of utilitarian efficiency and false-name-proofness in social choice

Julien Lesca, Taiki Todo, Makoto Yokoo

研究成果: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

5 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

The class of Groves mechanisms has been attracting much attention in mechanism design literature due to two attractive characteristics: utilitarian efficiency (also called social welfare maximization) and dominant strategy incentive compatibility. However, when strategic agents can create multiple fake identities and reveal more than one preference under them, a refined characteristic called false-name-proofness is required. Utilitarian efficiency and false-name-proofness are incompatible in combinatorial auctions, if we also have individual rationality as a desired condition. However, although individual rationality is strongly desirable, if participation is mandatory due to social norms or reputations, a mechanism without individual rationality can be sustained. In this paper we investigate the relationship between utilitarian efficiency and false-name-proofness in a social choice environment with monetary transfers. We show that in our modelization no mechanism simultaneously satisfies utilitarian efficiency, false-name-proofness, and individual rationality. Considering this fact, we ignore individual rationality and design various mechanisms that simultaneously satisfy the other two properties. We also compare our different mechanisms in terms of the distance to individual rationality. Finally we illustrate our mechanisms on a facility location problem.

本文言語英語
ホスト出版物のタイトル13th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2014
出版社International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS)
ページ1201-1208
ページ数8
ISBN(電子版)9781634391313
出版ステータス出版済み - 2014
イベント13th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2014 - Paris, フランス
継続期間: 5 5 20145 9 2014

出版物シリーズ

名前13th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2014
2

その他

その他13th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2014
国/地域フランス
CityParis
Period5/5/145/9/14

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • 人工知能

引用スタイル