Competitive Auctions and Envy-Freeness for Group of Agents

Taiki Todo, Atsushi Iwasaki, Makoto Yokoo

研究成果: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

1 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

In mechanism design, fairness is one of the central criteria for analyzing mechanisms. Recently, a new fairness concept called envy-freeness of a group toward a group (GtG-EFness) has received attention, which requires that no group of agents envies any other group. In this paper, we consider GtG-EFness in more general combinatorial auctions, including several subclasses of the multi-unit auction domain (unit-demand, diminishing marginal values, and all-or-nothing), and reveal the tight bound of the competitive ratios. In particular, we prove that the tight bound of the competitive ratio is 1/k (where k is the number of items) for the general combinatorial auction domain. We also clarify the relationship with Walrasian equilibria and conclude that no group envies any other group in any Walrasian equilibrium.

本文言語英語
ホスト出版物のタイトルComputing and Combinatorics - 25th International Conference, COCOON 2019, Proceedings
編集者Ding-Zhu Du, Zhenhua Duan, Cong Tian
出版社Springer Verlag
ページ541-553
ページ数13
ISBN(印刷版)9783030261757
DOI
出版ステータス出版済み - 2019
イベント25th International Computing and Combinatorics Conference, COCOON 2019 - Xi'an, 中国
継続期間: 7 29 20197 31 2019

出版物シリーズ

名前Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
11653 LNCS
ISSN(印刷版)0302-9743
ISSN(電子版)1611-3349

会議

会議25th International Computing and Combinatorics Conference, COCOON 2019
国/地域中国
CityXi'an
Period7/29/197/31/19

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • 理論的コンピュータサイエンス
  • コンピュータ サイエンス(全般)

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