Computing a subgame perfect equilibrium of a sequential matching game

Yasushi Kawase, Yutaro Yamaguchi, Yu Yokoi

研究成果: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

2 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

We study a decentralized matching market in which each firm sequentially makes offers to potential workers. For each offer, the worker can choose "accept" or "reject," but the decision is irrevocable. The acceptance of an offer guarantees her job at the firm, but it may also eliminate chances of better offers from other firms in the future. We formulate this market as a perfect-information extensive-form game played by the workers. Each instance of this game has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE), which does not necessarily lead to a stable matching and has some perplexing properties. Our aim is to establish the complexity of computing the SPE, or more precisely, deciding whether each offer is accepted in the SPE. We show that the tractability of this problem drastically changes according to the number of potential offers related to each firm and worker. If each firm makes offers to at most two workers (or each worker receives offers from at most two firms), then the problem is efficiently solved by a variant of the deferred acceptance algorithm. In contrast, the problem is PSPACE-hard even if both firms and workers are related to at most three offers.

本文言語英語
ホスト出版物のタイトルACM EC 2018 - Proceedings of the 2018 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation
出版社Association for Computing Machinery, Inc
ページ131-148
ページ数18
ISBN(電子版)9781450358293
DOI
出版ステータス出版済み - 6 11 2018
外部発表はい
イベント19th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, EC 2018 - Ithaca, 米国
継続期間: 6 18 20186 22 2018

出版物シリーズ

名前ACM EC 2018 - Proceedings of the 2018 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation

会議

会議19th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, EC 2018
Country米国
CityIthaca
Period6/18/186/22/18

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Computer Science (miscellaneous)
  • Statistics and Probability
  • Computational Mathematics
  • Economics and Econometrics

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