Cooperation maintained by fitness adjustment

Christine Taylor, Janet Chen, Yoh Iwasa

研究成果: ジャーナルへの寄稿学術誌査読

8 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

Questions: Can cooperation be enhanced if players whose performance is higher than the mean are forced to pay an additional cost in each generation? Mathematical methods: Analysis of replicator dynamics with mutation. The ESS distribution of cooperation level is obtained. Key assumptions: Players engage in a cooperative dilemma game, and at the end of each generation those whose performance is higher than the mean are forced to pay an additional cost. Conclusions: Without mutation, the entire population eventually conforms to a single cooperation level determined by the initial composition of the population. With mutation, there is an equilibrium distribution of cooperation, which has a peak at an intermediate level of cooperation. Whether it is institutionalized such as tax or just a social custom, fitness adjustment based ultimately on people's 'envy' is able to maintain cooperation.

本文言語英語
ページ(範囲)1023-1041
ページ数19
ジャーナルEvolutionary Ecology Research
9
6
出版ステータス出版済み - 10月 2007

!!!All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • 生態学
  • 生態、進化、行動および分類学
  • 遺伝学
  • 遺伝学(臨床)

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