Core stability in hedonic games among friends and enemies: Impact of Neutrals

Kazunori Ota, Nathanaël Barrot, Anisse Ismaili, Yuko Sakurai, Makoto Yokoo

研究成果: 著書/レポートタイプへの貢献会議での発言

5 引用 (Scopus)

抄録

We investigate hedonic games under enemies aversion and friends appreciation, where every agent considers other agents as either a friend or an enemy. We extend these simple preferences by allowing each agent to also consider other agents to be neutral. Neutrals have no impact on her preference, as in a graphical hedonic game. Surprisingly, we discover that neutral agents do not simplify matters, but cause complexity. We prove that the core can be empty under enemies aversion and the strict core can be empty under friends appreciation. Furthermore, we show that under both preferences, deciding whether the strict core is nonempty, is NP NP -complete. This complexity extends to the core under enemies aversion. We also show that under friends appreciation, we can always find a core stable coalition structure in polynomial time.

元の言語英語
ホスト出版物のタイトル26th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 2017
編集者Carles Sierra
出版者International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence
ページ359-365
ページ数7
ISBN(電子版)9780999241103
出版物ステータス出版済み - 1 1 2017
イベント26th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 2017 - Melbourne, オーストラリア
継続期間: 8 19 20178 25 2017

出版物シリーズ

名前IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
ISSN(印刷物)1045-0823

その他

その他26th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 2017
オーストラリア
Melbourne
期間8/19/178/25/17

Fingerprint

Polynomials

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Artificial Intelligence

これを引用

Ota, K., Barrot, N., Ismaili, A., Sakurai, Y., & Yokoo, M. (2017). Core stability in hedonic games among friends and enemies: Impact of Neutrals. : C. Sierra (版), 26th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 2017 (pp. 359-365). (IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence). International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence.

Core stability in hedonic games among friends and enemies : Impact of Neutrals. / Ota, Kazunori; Barrot, Nathanaël; Ismaili, Anisse; Sakurai, Yuko; Yokoo, Makoto.

26th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 2017. 版 / Carles Sierra. International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence, 2017. p. 359-365 (IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence).

研究成果: 著書/レポートタイプへの貢献会議での発言

Ota, K, Barrot, N, Ismaili, A, Sakurai, Y & Yokoo, M 2017, Core stability in hedonic games among friends and enemies: Impact of Neutrals. : C Sierra (版), 26th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 2017. IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence, pp. 359-365, 26th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 2017, Melbourne, オーストラリア, 8/19/17.
Ota K, Barrot N, Ismaili A, Sakurai Y, Yokoo M. Core stability in hedonic games among friends and enemies: Impact of Neutrals. : Sierra C, 編集者, 26th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 2017. International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence. 2017. p. 359-365. (IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence).
Ota, Kazunori ; Barrot, Nathanaël ; Ismaili, Anisse ; Sakurai, Yuko ; Yokoo, Makoto. / Core stability in hedonic games among friends and enemies : Impact of Neutrals. 26th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 2017. 編集者 / Carles Sierra. International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence, 2017. pp. 359-365 (IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence).
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