Designing matching mechanisms under general distributional constraints

Masahiro Goto, Fuhito Kojima, Ryoji Kurata, Akihisa Tamura, Makoto Yokoo

研究成果: Contribution to journalArticle査読

23 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

To handle various applications, we study matching under constraints. The only requirement on the constraints is heredity; given a feasible matching, any matching with fewer students at each school is also feasible. Heredity subsumes existing constraints such as regional maximum quotas and diversity constraints. With constraints, there may not exist a matching that satisfies fairness and nonwastefulness (i.e., stability). We demonstrate our new mechanism, the Adaptive Deferred Acceptance mechanism (ADA), satisfies strategy-proofness for students, nonwastefulness, and a weaker fairness property. We also offer a technique to apply ADA even if heredity is violated (e.g., minimum quotas).

本文言語英語
ページ(範囲)226-262
ページ数37
ジャーナルAmerican Economic Journal: Microeconomics
9
2
DOI
出版ステータス出版済み - 5 1 2017

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • 経済学、計量経済学および金融学(全般)

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