Designing matching mechanisms under general distributional constraints

Masahiro Goto, Fuhito Kojima, Ryoji Kurata, Akihisa Tamura, Makoto Yokoo

研究成果: ジャーナルへの寄稿記事

14 引用 (Scopus)

抜粋

To handle various applications, we study matching under constraints. The only requirement on the constraints is heredity; given a feasible matching, any matching with fewer students at each school is also feasible. Heredity subsumes existing constraints such as regional maximum quotas and diversity constraints. With constraints, there may not exist a matching that satisfies fairness and nonwastefulness (i.e., stability). We demonstrate our new mechanism, the Adaptive Deferred Acceptance mechanism (ADA), satisfies strategy-proofness for students, nonwastefulness, and a weaker fairness property. We also offer a technique to apply ADA even if heredity is violated (e.g., minimum quotas).

元の言語英語
ページ(範囲)226-262
ページ数37
ジャーナルAmerican Economic Journal: Microeconomics
9
発行部数2
DOI
出版物ステータス出版済み - 5 1 2017

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All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)

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